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GOOD "BRICK" WALLS MAKE GOOD
NEIGHBORS: SHOULD A STATE COURT
CERTIFY A MULTISTATE OR NATIONWIDE
CLASS OF INDIRECT PURCHASERS?
John C. Anderson*
Think for a moment about that compact disc you bought last week.
Do you remember how much you paid for it? Hold onto your receipt.
There is a good chance you were overcharged. Long ago you
grudgingly accepted your inability to purchase CDs at a lower price,
but perhaps the hour has come for a coordinated consumer challenge
to the marketing practices of this powerful industry. The question is:
what form should this challenge take?
When introduced in the early 1980s, CDs were quite expensive, in
part because of the technological innovation required for their
development and production.' As time passed and the technology
became more accessible, industry observers expected prices to fall?
The general trend during the 1990s, however, has been exactly the
opposite. Each year since 1991, the average price of a CD at retail has
increased despite lower production costs.' This increase, combined
with recent consolidations of market power within the music industry,
has given rise to numerous allegations of manufacturer collusion to
artificially maintain prices.4
In 1995, the owner of a retail music store filed a class action in
federal court in California against six major music distributors,
claiming a manufacturer conspiracy to fix CD prices in violation of
both the Sherman Act,5 and state antitrust laws.' Following this filing
* For his support of this Note and countless other endeavors, I owe a debt of gratitude
to my father, an alumnus of this law review, who taught me most of what I know
about the law, and about life.
1. See David Segal, A Class-Action Fight? That's Music to His Ears: Big CD
Makers Are Michael Hausfeld's Latest Corporate Foes, Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1996, at
F9.
2. Id
3. Id.
4. Id; see also Mark Hamblett, CD Prices Hit Sour Note With Attorneys General
States File Lawsuit on Heels of FTC Probe, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 9, 2000, at I (discussing
recent actions brought by state attorneys general against members of the recording
industry for alleged illegal price fixing).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (rendering illegal any "combination in the form of trust or
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by direct purchasers, a group of consumers who purchased CDs at the
retail level filed a similar suit to recover alleged overcharges in CD
prices.' Despite the apparent similarity of these two suits, the
interplay of antitrust and civil procedure issues surrounding these suits
gave rise to significant differences between them.
This Note examines a decision that will, in all likelihood, soon face
a state court: whether to certify a multistate or nationwide class of
indirect purchasers, including plaintiffs from states without an
established right of recovery for indirect purchasers. 8 This Note
attempts to answer whether such a certification would, in fact, be
prudent given the policies of state antitrust law, the benefits sought
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,9 relevant
choice-of-law jurisprudence, and the constraints of the Constitution.
Much of the discussion will focus on the contrasting interests of
plaintiffs seeking aggregated recovery for antitrust violations through
the use of the class action device 10 and defendants' opposition to class
certification in hopes of avoiding potentially massive liability.
Part I of this Note provides a sketch of the relevant antitrust law,
12
and the recent jurisprudence out of which this issue has taken shape.
The discussion then shifts to outline the current status of antitrust
class actions in state courts and the procedural tactics employed by
both plaintiffs and defendants to further their respective interests in
this context. 3 Lastly, Part I examines the choice-of-law issues likely
to arise in the context of the certification decision, and provides the
necessary background in this area of law. The main proposal
advanced here is that a plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel petitioning a
court for certification will try to convince the court of the substantial
justice to be achieved by such an action, while concurrently
establishing the presence of important state interests that would be
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce"); see Wilder Enters., Inc.
v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980); Martin B. Glauser
Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1977) (discussing the
elements necessary to sustain a cause of action for violation of § 1 of the Sherman

Act). For a general scholarly discussion of the Sherman Act and its implications for
business practices, see generally 2 Earl W. Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law (1980).
6. Jonathan Davies, Labels' CD Pricing Draws Class-Action Suit in Calif:
Uniform Charge Means Fix Is in, RetailerSays, Hollywood Rep., June 1, 1995, at 4.
7. Robinson v. EMI Music Distribution, Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,510
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1996).
8. See Kevin J. O'Connor, Is The Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, Antitrust,
Summer 2001, at 34, 38 (describing the attempted certification of a multistate class of
indirect purchasers as a possible trend in antitrust litigation).
9. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (governing class actions). While this Note will focus

primarily on class actions in state courts, most state rules governing class actions are
substantially similar to the federal rules.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part III.G.
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
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furthered through adjudication of such a dispute. 4 To this end,
plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel may attempt to justify application of
forum law to the entire class, essentially permitting recovery by any
indirect purchaser regardless of the policies or laws of sister states. 5
Part H of this Note examines the arguments available to counsel for
either maintaining or defeating class certification, with a focus on
arguments supporting the constitutionality of class-wide application of
forum law.16 This section also outlines secondary judicial initiatives
enabling a state court to provide a remedy to a nationwide class of
indirect purchasers despite constitutional choice-of-law restraints."
Part III of this Note attempts to provide an analysis of the success
or failure of the arguments proffered in Part II. 11 The focus here will
be threefold, addressing (1) the constitutionality of class-wide
application of forum law, 19 (2) concerns of federalism and interstate
comity that may influence a court's decision,'0 and (3) a desire to
prevent abuse of the class action device.2' This Note ultimately
concludes that a state court should not certify a nationwide or
multistate class of indirect purchasers primarily because constitutional
mandates would require the forum state to discern and apply the laws
of various states to the controversy. Aside from the possible failure of
such an action to meet statutory requirements, certification of such a
class would produce such inefficiencies as to benefit neither the state,
nor the litigants, and in fact impose a significant burden on an already
taxed state court system.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ILLINOIS BRICK WALL

This section begins by providing a brief background in antitrust
principles and, specifically, the current relationship between federal
and state antitrust law. It then looks at the procedural hurdles
relevant to class certification and concludes with a sketch of the
choice-of-law jurisprudence that comes into play when a state court
certifies a multistate class. Despite its statutory foundations, the most
significant developments in the fields of law discussed herein have
come through judicial interpretations of these statutes. Thus, while
paying due heed to the message contained within the statutes
themselves, the main focus in this Note will be the case law shaping
these bodies of law.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part
See infra Part

I.C.
I.C.
II.A.
II.B.
III.A-B.
III.B.
III.F.
III.G.
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A. Indirect Purchasersin State and FederalAntitrust Law
A central tenet of antitrust law is the Sherman Act's prohibition of
any "conspiracy in restraint of trade."' Attempts by manufacturers to
fix and maintain the price of goods entering the market constitute a
violation of that law.'
This type of illegal price fixing by
manufacturers 24 may result in economic injury to two distinct groups
of purchasers. Direct purchasers, such as the music retailers discussed
above, suffer because they pay a higher price for the product than
they would in a perfectly competitive marketplace'
Indirect
purchasers,26 those who purchase a manufacturer's goods through one
or more middlemen, suffer when such an overcharge is passed-on to
them by the retailer.2 7
The Clayton Act' provides a private right of action for anyone
harmed by illegal price fixing and allows for recovery of treble
damages plus reasonable attorney fees for plaintiffs who demonstrate
injury resulting from violation of federal antitrust law.2 9 This
provision is intended to provide a significant incentive for private
parties to bring enforcement actions against perceived violators by
permitting recovery far in excess of the actual injury. 0

22. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
23. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927)
(condemning all price fixing arrangements as a violation of federal antitrust law).
24. While price fixing is illegal under both federal and state law, references will be
primarily to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27 (1994), both prohibiting collusion to fix prices.
25. For a discussion of the nature of commerce in a situation of perfect
competition and the effect of price fixing on such a market, see Phillip E. Areeda,
Introduction to Antitrust Economics, in Collaborations Among Competitors 7
(Eleanor M. Fox & James T. Halverson eds., 1991).
26. By definition an indirect purchaser is one who purchases a product from
anyone other than the manufacturer. In the present context, however, it most often
refers to the end-user or consumer. For a general discussion of the distinction
between direct and indirect purchasers, see C. Douglas Floyd & E. Thomas Sullivan,
Private Antitrust Actions: The Structure and Process of Civil Antitrust Litigation §
6.2.2 (1996).
27. See Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly
Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 269, 277-87 (1979)

(discussing the economic principles at work in a situation of passing on an illegal
overcharge).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994); see also In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627,
635 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981) (requiring a demonstration of actual injury as a
necessary element of antitrust cause of action).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a); see also Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Mem'l Park
Cemetery Ass'n, 666 F.2d 1130, 1138 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that in order to prevail
under § 15, plaintiff must prove both a violation of antitrust law and resultant injury).
30. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement
rationale behind federal antitrust law).
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1. Indirect Purchasers Come Up Against a "Brick" Wall Under
Federal Antitrust Statutes
Responding to private actions by direct purchasers alleging illegal
collusion, defendants often assert that these purchasers avoided actual
harm by passing-on any overcharge to the consumer.3 The Supreme
Court addressed this "pass-on" argument in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.23 Hanover Shoe involved a civil suit
filed by a shoe manufacturer against a producer of shoe
manufacturing equipment, following an action by the United States
government against the same defendant for violations of federal
antitrust law.33 Plaintiff Hanover Shoe Inc. claimed damage resulting
from defendant United's monopolistic practices, including defendant's
refusal to sell, rather than lease, vital and complex manufacturing
equipment.34 Contesting the award of damages, United claimed that
Hanover had not suffered any damages because any overcharge
initially borne by the plaintiff had been passed-on to Hanover's
customers.3 Resolving this question, the Court held that a
manufacturer is liable for the entire overcharge paid by a direct
purchaser regardless of whether or not the direct purchaser passed-on
such overcharge to its customers.' This decision effectively barred
the use of a pass-on theory by antitrust defendants." This left the
antitrust defendant subject to the possibility of liability to both diruct
and indirect purchasers for the same course of conduct."
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this apparent inequity in
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.39 Illinois Brick concerned a claim by the
31. This argument met with mixed results in lower federal courts. Compare Wolfe
v. Nat'l Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir. 1955) (sustaining a pass-on defense in a
case involving the sale of manufacturing equipment), with Atl. City Elec. Co. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59,71 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (rejecting a pass-on claim by defendant
manufacturers of equipment used in the production of electricity).
32. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
33. Id. at 484-85; see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953) (holding United Shoe liable for a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits monopolization of an industry).
34. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483.
35. Id. at 487-88.
36. Id. at 494.
37. Id. The Court carved a narrow exception to the use of a defensive pass-on
argument. The Court held this defense permissible in situations in which the direct
purchaser marketed the goods under a cost-plus contract. Id. This decision
theoretically renders it quite easy for a defendant to demonstrate that a direct
purchaser had passed on the overcharge to its customers. Id.; see also Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977) (noting that a pass-on defense may also be
permitted in situations where the direct purchaser is owned or substantially controlled
by the manufacturer). For a general discussion of the cost-plus exception to the rule
of Hanover Shoe, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-PurchaserRide and CostPlus Sales, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1717 (1990).
38. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 720.
39. Id. at 724-26.
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state of Illinois and other indirect purchasers against manufacturers of
concrete products, alleging illegal collusion, which resulted in
artificially inflated prices for concrete block. 0 In Illinois Brick, the
Court seemingly complemented its decision in Hanover Shoe by
holding that a pass-on claim could not be used in an offensive capacity
to establish a manufacturer's liability to indirect purchasers." That is,
indirect purchasers cannot sustain a cause of action by claiming that a
direct purchaser had passed-on an illegal overcharge to them. The
obvious effect of this decision was to deny a remedy to indirect
purchasers for violation of federal antitrust laws.42
In establishing this rule, the Court in Illinois Brick announced an
important policy goal that continues to influence antitrust litigation to
this day. 43 First, the Court determined the primary goal of federal
antitrust law to be deterrence of collusive conduct, rather than
restitution for victims of such conduct." Allowing indirect purchasers
to enter their claims alongside direct purchasers would thwart this
goal by requiring the court to entertain a complex economic analysis
to determine the exact proportion of the overcharge passed on to the
indirect purchaser.45 This would have the effect of protracting such
litigation as well as diluting the recovery available to direct
purchasers, thus limiting the incentive for direct purchasers to bring
antitrust suits and "seriously
impair[ing] this important weapon of
' 46
antitrust enforcement.

An influential counterweight to the holding in Illinois Brick came in
the Court's resolution of California v. ARC America Corp.47 ARC
America involved a claim by several states to a portion of a settlement
disposing of both state and federal antitrust claims against
manufacturers of concrete products for their alleged collusive
40. Id. at 726-27.
41. Id. at 729-47.
42. Id.
43. See Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official's Reflections on Antitrust Class
Actions, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 439-51 (1997) (discussing the tension between the dual
purposes of deterrence and redress in the context of antitrust class actions).
44. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 745-46; see also Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United
Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971) (explaining the
purpose of § 4 of the Clayton Act to be the provision of "a private enforcement
weapon that will deter violation of the federal antitrust laws"). But see Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977) (establishing the dual
purposes of antitrust law as deterrence and provision of a remedy to victims of illegal
conduct).
45. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 740-43.
46. Id. at 745. For an economic analysis of the question of indirect purchaser
standing, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers
Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws?: An Economic Analysis of the Rule
of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602 (1979) (approving of the Court's ruling in
Illinois Brick and arguing that deterrence rather than compensation should be the
primary goal of antitrust law).
47. 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
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attempts to stabilize the price of concrete block.l The state plaintiffs
in ARC America were indirect purchasers of concrete products that
had been incorporated into state sponsored building projects.4
Reduced to its essence, the state plaintiffs sought federal recognition
of the validity of state antitrust laws granting a right of recovery to
indirect purchasers." Both defendants and direct purchaser plaintiffs
opposed such recovery on the grounds that federal approval of such
laws would dilute the amount of recovery available to direct
purchasers, thus circumventing the policy goals announced in Illinois
Brick."
Upholding the validity of such state laws, the Court granted
recovery to the state plaintiffs and held that in enacting federal
antitrust law, Congress had not intended to "occup[yJ the field"5 and
preempt state law. 3 To the contrary, Congress intended federal
antitrust law to supplement state antitrust law, principally for the
purpose of addressing those violations falling outside the ambit of an
individual state's jurisdiction.' The Court further held that state
antitrust laws permitting recovery by indirect purchasers did not "pose
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of
Congress"' and consequently did not run afoul of the Supremacy
Clause. 6 In so holding, the Court effectively opened the door to a
new generation of antitrust actions in state courts governed by state
rather than federal, antitrust law.
2. State Antitrust Actions in the Wake of ARC America
Following ARC America, several state legislatures passed statutes
granting indirect purchasers a right of recovery for violation of state
antitrust law, or amended the state antitrust law to allow for such
recovery 8 Presently, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia
48. Id. at 97-99.
49. Id. at 97.
50. Id. at 100.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Id. at 100
53. Id. at 100-02.
54. Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme. 58 Ind. LI. 375,
378 (1983); see also 21 Cong. Rec. 2456-57 (1890) (providing remarks of Senator
Sherman).
55. ARC America, 490 U.S. at 102.
56. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
57. See Ronald W. Davis, Indirect PurchaserLitigation: ARC America's Chickens
Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 Antitrust LI. 375,376 (1997).
58. ARC America Task Force Report. Report of the American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law Task Force to Review the Supreme Court's Decision in
California v. ARC America Corp., 59 Antitrust LJ. 271, 278. (1990). Prior to the
Court's decision in ARC America, several states had passed laws granting a right of
recovery to indirect purchasers. See, eg., Ala. Code § 6-5-60 (Michie 1975); Miss.
Code Ann. § 75-21-9 (West 1999). Several states not passing repealer statutes,
granted indirect purchasers standing through common law repealers or decisions
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allow for some type of recovery by indirect purchasers.59 The
remaining states, however, implicitly' deny a right of recovery to
indirect purchasers.6 1 Many do so through the assertion that state

antitrust law should be read in conformity with its federal
counterpart. 62
Actions brought in state courts under these Illinois Brick repealer 63
statutes often follow nationwide actions by direct purchasers in
federal courts.' 4 Consequently, many indirect purchaser actions are
brought in response to national, rather than local, activities. 65 Very
66
often such cases are filed in multiple jurisdictions concurrently.
Unlike the federal system, which consolidates multi- district
6
litigation,67 no multi-district procedure exists at the state level.
Accordingly, many state court cases may proceed at the same time

against the same defendant or defendants.69
The allowance of multiple suits results in numerous inefficiencies
including duplicative discovery and other pre-trial proceedings.70
interpreting state laws against unfair trade practices to allow for recovery by indirect
purchasers. See, e.g., FTC v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)
(establishing a right of recovery for indirect purchasers in several states); Hyde v.
Abbott Labs, Inc., 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (establishing a right of
recovery for indirect purchasers in North Carolina); Blake v. Abbott Labs Inc., 1996-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,369 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (interpreting Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act of 1977 to allow for recovery by indirect purchasers).
59. For a comprehensive list of states having so called Illinois Brick repealer
statutes, and the variations among them, see Thomas Greene et al., State Antitrust
Law and Enforcement, 1252 PLI/Corp 1129 (2001).
60. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987); Abbott Labs,
Inc. v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995) (finding Texas antitrust law to prohibit
recovery by indirect purchasers).
61. See Davis, supra note 57, at 379-80 nn.24-29 and accompanying text.
62- See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.04 (stating "[t]he provisions of this
Act shall be construed... in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of
comparable federal antitrust statutes"); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2113 (1974).
63. Davis, supra note 57, at 375.
64. Id. at 376; see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., MDL
May 27, 1994) (illustrating nationwide
997, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7146 (N.D. I11.
antitrust suit in federal courts giving rise to indirect purchaser claims in state courts);
In re Infant Formula Antitrust Litig., MDL 878, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21981 (N.D.
Fla. Mar. 2, 1992).
65. See Greene, supra note 59, at 1144-47.
66. See Private Class Action Suits Against Microsoft Dismissed in Iowa, Kentucky,
Nevada, Rhode Island, May Proceed in Tennessee, California,National Association of
Attorneys General-Antitrust Report, July/Aug. 2000, at 14. [hereinafter Private Class
73,339
Action]; see also In re Vitamin Antitrust Litig., 2001-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
(D.D.C. 2001).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994) ("When civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be
transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.").
68. Joel M. Cohen & Trisha Lawson, Navigating Multistate Indirect Purchaser
Lawsuits, Antitrust, Summer 2001, at 29,31.
69. See Private Class Action, supra note 66.
70. See Cohen & Lawson, supra note 68, at 29 (describing the current situation as
an "uncoordinated wave of state court cases raising substantially the same legal and
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Further, the concurrent filing of many actions against the same
defendants permits what some perceive to be a chess game of sorts,
with each side litigating more aggressively in forums they perceive as
favorable to their position.?
B. Nationwide or Multistate Certificationin State Courts

One tactic that has recently emerged in this context is the attempted
certification of a nationwide or multistate class of indirect purchasers
in a state in which the plaintiffs perceive some type of advantage, such
as favorable certification standards.' While this phenomenon has
appeared in few published decisions, it has the potential to become
more widespread. 3 This section discusses the procedural issues raised
generally by multistate or nationwide class certification.
1. State Court Jurisdiction Over a Multistate Class: A Shutts Analysis
As an initial inquiry, a state court considering certification of a
multistate class must ensure proper personal jurisdiction over both the
plaintiff class members as well as the defendant. 7 Assuming for
present purposes the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, a nationwide class would almost certainly include plaintiffs
having had no prior contact with the forum state."3 As such, a
straightforward reading of the Supreme Court's "minimum contacts"
holding in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 6 would seem to

preclude a state court's exercise of jurisdiction over such plaintiffs. In
factual issues").
71. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 35 (stating that -each side may attempt to have
the class certification issue resolved first in states with law perceived to be favorable
to its side, thereby adding another layer of tactical complexity to these cases").
72. See Robinson v. EMI Music Distribution, Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) q
71,510 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1996) (granting conditional certification to a class of CD
purchasers from fourteen states with Illinois Brick repealer statutes or common law
decisions affording a remedy to indirect purchasers). The vast majority of indirect
purchaser actions are filed in the form of a class action due to the generally small
amount of each potential claim. William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect
PurchaserSuits: Class Certificationin the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 Antitrust LJ. 1.
3 & n.12 (1999); see also City of St. Paul v. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
69,305 (D. Minn. 1990) (certifying nationwide class of indirect purchasers in federal
court).
73. See John C. Coffee Jr., Class Actions: InterjurisdictionalWarfare, N.Y. LJ.,
Sept. 25, 1997, at 5.
74. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
75. If plaintiffs hail from every state in the union, reason informs us that at least
some portion of those plaintiffs would, prior to the filing of the lawsuit, have had no
meaningful contact with the forum state.
76. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The Supreme Court held in InternationalShoe that in
order to issue a judgment binding on a party, that party must "have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
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Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,77 however, the Court rejected this
assumption.78
Clarifying its holding in InternationalShoe, the Court explained that
the minimum contacts standard of InternationalShoe was established
to protect defendants from the difficulties and expenses of conducting
litigation in a foreign jurisdiction. 79 A defendant hailed into court in a
distant jurisdiction almost certainly faces significant expenditures for
travel and the hiring of local counsel to represent him, 0° whereas the
unnamed plaintiff in a class action bears none of these risks or
expenses. In short, the burdens imposed upon an out-of-state
defendant are far greater than those imposed on an out-of-state
unnamed plaintiff adequately represented by named parties.8'
Therefore, the constitutional demands of due process do not require
minimum contacts with unnamed plaintiffs in a multistate class action
in order to issue a judgment binding on the plaintiff. 82 Kansas, the
Court held, could properly exercise judicial jurisdiction over the
claims of the entire plaintiff class.13 In so holding, the Court
effectively opened the door to the adjudication of claims by a forum
lacking substantial contact with the underlying controversy and
provided apparent encouragement for the use of multistate class
actions in state courts. 84
2. Statutory Requirements for Class Certification: A Rule 23 Analysis
Assuming proper jurisdiction over the parties, a state court
contemplating certification of a multistate or nationwide class of
indirect purchasers must determine whether the proposed class
complies with the relevant statutory provisions governing class
actions.8 1 Such statutes 6 typically require a proposed class to meet
77. 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
78. The Court in Shutts held that the state of Kansas could properly exercise
jurisdiction over the claims of non-resident plaintiffs lacking minimum contacts, in the
context of a multistate class action. For a further discussion of Shutts, see infra notes
100-05 and accompanying text.
79. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977) (holding that a state court could not properly exercise jurisdiction
over a non-resident having no purposeful contact with the forum state).
80. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
81. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808.
82. See id. at 812. The court did hold, however, that demands of due process
require potential class members be afforded the opportunity to opt out of the class
and the "opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person
or through counsel." Id. For a more detailed discussion of the opt-out requirement in
class actions, see John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 Ariz. L.
Rev. 3 (1983).
83. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812.
84. See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice-of-law in
Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 Yale L.J. 1, 57
(1986).
85. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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several fundamental standards. Chief among these are commonality
of legal or factual issues, 87 typicality of the claims of class
representatives,"' numerosity of plaintiffs such that traditional joinder
would be impracticable,' and adequacy of representation by named
plaintiffs." Should a court find a proposed class in satisfaction of
these prerequisites, the threshold for class certification has been met.'
Subsumed under Rule 23, or the state equivalent, are three types of
class actions. For purposes of the present discussion the only relevant
one is that found in Rule 23(b)(3), which allows for groups of
claimants with common questions of law or fact to join their claims for
treatment as a class.' The crux of 23(b)(3) is the "predominance"
test, requiring that "questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members."'93 This statement does not require a complete absence of
individual issues, only that common ones "predominate." '
Though often fatal to otherwise viable class actions, the
predominance requirement of Rule 23 is undoubtedly consistent with
the announced policy goal of enhanced efficiency through collective
resolution of claims of a similar nature.96 Absent the predominance
requirement, the employment of a class action device would yield no
benefit in terms of judicial economy since a court would then have to
apply varying standards of substantive law to each plaintiff class
member. 97
In summary, the primary statutory and constitutional obstacles to
the certification of a multistate or nationwide class of indirect
purchasers are personal jurisdiction and the statutory requirements
attendant to class treatment. The former obstacle was seemingly
neutralized by the Supreme Court's decision in Shuns; the latter,
however, remains and must be satisfied before a court may proceed.

86. See infra notes 272-73 and accompanying text. Most, if not all state rules of

civil procedure mirror the federal rules with respect to class actions. See, e.g., Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 23.01.
87. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).

88. Id. R. 23(a)(3).

89. Id. R. 23(a)(1).
90. Id R. 23(a)(4).
91. Before certifying a class, however, the court must determine class treatment to
be the best available method for resolution of the claims. See id. R. 23(b).
92. Id. R. 23(b)(3).
93. Id.
94. See Stephen R. Bough & Andrea G. Bough, Conflict of Laws and Multi-State
Class Actions: How Variations in State Law Affect the PredominanceRequirement of
Rule 23(b)(3), 68 UMKC L. Rev. 1 (1999) (discussing the treatment of multistate
class actions in federal courts).

95. See infra Part III.D.

96. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966).

97. See id.; see also infra Part III.D.
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C. Choice-of-law Inquiry
Central to a determination of the suitability of treating a group of
plaintiffs from different states as a single class is the question of
choice-of-law. For reasons discussed below, 98 the determination of
applicable law may be dispositive in the context of a proposed
multistate or nationwide class. This section provides some useful
background regarding choice-of-law in the context of recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
1. Choice-of-law in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Shutts
In a multistate or nationwide class action, the most serious potential
challenge to class-wide application of forum law is that such
application would be inconsistent with the demands of the
Constitution.99 Applicability would center on a discussion of the
Supreme Court's treatment of this issue under similar circumstances
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.' ° Shutts involved a multistate class
action filed by the owners of oil and gas royalties, claiming that
Phillips failed to pay interest on royalties temporarily withheld from
the plaintiffs pending approval of a rate increase by the Federal Power
Commission.'
The leased lands from which Phillips produced
natural gas were located in eleven different statesY The owners of
the royalties were located in all fifty states and several foreign
countries." 3 Plaintiffs initiated this class action in Kansas" on behalf
of all royalty holders despite the fact that fewer than 1000 of the
28,000 plaintiffs resided in that state and less than one quarter of one
percent of the land in question was located in Kansas)0 5
In this context, choice-of-law concerns figure importantly for two
distinct reasons. First, concern for constitutional due process rights 0 6
requires that before subjecting a defendant to the substantive law of a
given jurisdiction, that defendant must have some contact with a state
so as to avoid unfair surprise in the application of unfavorable
substantive law.0 7 In forming its conduct, a potential defendant may
98. See infra Part II.A.1.
99. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (challenging the
constitutionality of uniform application of forum law to a multistate class).
100. Id. For a fuller discussion of the factual background of the Shutts case, see
John E. Kennedy, The Supreme Court Meets the Bride of Frankenstein: Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts and the State Multistate Class Action, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 255
(1985).
101. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 800.

102- Id. at 799.
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 801.

106. U.S. Const. amend. V.
107. See Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 3, 93 & n.253
(1989).
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well have relied on the substantive law of a given jurisdiction,
rendering it unfair to apply a different set of laws to that defendant's

conduct after a dispute has arisen."ts Second, the nature of our federal

system and the demands of the Full Faith and Credit Clause"t inform
us of a sovereign state's right to further the policies behind its laws
through application of those laws to disputes with which it has a
significant connection.'10 As one commentator explains:
A state court applying its law to a multistate plaintiff class disregards
any interest other states may have in applying their laws to the
matters from which the dispute arose. In so doing, the forum
encroaches upon the rights of other states to adjudicate disputes
according to the social and economic policies enacted by their
legislatures or formed by their courts.11"
This concern is well illustrated by the Court's discussion of the
secondary purpose behind the minimum contacts standard as
established by International Shoe.12
The minimum contacts
requirement was intended not only for the protection of the

defendant, but also for the protection of the interests of the statesthat their fellow sovereigns not overstep the bounds of their proper
authority in the application of their laws." 3
In short, a choice-of-law determination would most likely have a
profound influence on a state court's willingness to certify a
nationwide or multistate class of indirect purchasers.
Such a
determination, however, is neither simple nor without significant
ramifications for interstate relationships. As demonstrated in the
following section, choice-of-law has historically been an area of some

108. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. g (1971) (-Generally
speaking, it would be unfair and improper to hold a person liable under the local law
of one state when he had justifiably molded his conduct to conform to the
requirements of another state."); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the
Common Law 110-12 (1988) (discussing the validity of the reliance interest and
distinguishing various types of reliance).
109. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (providing that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State").
110. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
111. William D. Torchiana, Comment, Choice of Law and the Multistate Class:
Forum Interests in Matters Distant, 134 U. Pa. L Rev. 913,918 (1986).
112. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
113. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980)
(explaining that the minimum contacts required for exercise of personal jurisdiction
serve to protect not only the right of defendants, but additionally the right of states to
further their own policies through application of their laws); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (explaining that although the difficulties attendant to distant
litigation may diminish with the rise of technology, the minimum contacts standard
serves the dual purpose of maintaining "territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States"). But see Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (holding that state interests are secondary to protection
of the defendant in personal jurisdiction analyses).
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difficulty for the Supreme Court,114with the resultant failed emergence
of a clear constitutional mandate.
2. Choice-of-law in Pre-Shutts Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Concerns of federalism and due process dictate that a state court
may not blindly apply its own law to an entire multistate class without
engaging in a principled choice-of-law analysis. This analysis seeks to
determine whether the forum has significant contacts creating state
interests such that there is neither unfair surprise to a defendant nor
complete disregard for the policies of its fellow sovereign states."5
This section attempts to provide an overview of the Supreme Court's
pre-Shutts choice-of-law jurisprudence to achieve a more complete
understanding of the constitutional boundaries of choice-of-law and
the application of this standard to a multistate or nationwide class of
indirect purchasers.
In several notable cases, state courts have applied forum law to
disputes having little or no connection to the forum state.116 The
Supreme Court's decision in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague" 7 was an
apparent attempt to formulate concrete constitutional standards for
choice-of-law." 8 At issue in Allstate was the application of Minnesota
law to a suit by a widow seeking recovery on three automobile
insurance policies issued to her late husband." 9 Prior to the husband's
death in a motorcycle accident, the couple resided in Wisconsin,
where the policies were issued. 20 The cars on which the policies were
issued were garaged principally in Wisconsin, and the accident in
which he was killed occurred in Wisconsin as well.' 2' Mrs. Hague filed
114. See Gene R. Shreve, Choice-of-Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 Ind.

L.J. 271, 271-72 (1996) (contending that the Supreme Court's failure to employ the
tools of the Constitution to cure "conflicts localism unfairly damages nonforum

litigants").
115. This statement of interest analysis-based choice-of-law considerations marks a
notable shift from earlier jurisprudence, which stressed a territorial, or vested rights
approach. For a comprehensive overview of the history of choice-of-law, see Harold
L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 772 (1983).
116. See Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn. 1978) (applying Minnesota law
to a claim by a Minnesota resident against a Wisconsin tavern owner, for damages
resulting from an automobile accident following the driver drinking at defendant's
establishment, where, despite defendant's residence, and localization of business
activities in Wisconsin, the Minnesota court denied him the protection of Wisconsin's
Dram Shop Act, and held him liable under Minnesota law).
117. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
118. Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 2448, 2506-07 (1999) (analyzing the Court's attempt to construct a
meaningful constitutional standard for choice-of-law, and concluding that the holding

"suppose[s] that the Constitution cares very little about the resolution of conflicts
between laws").
119. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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suit in Minnesota, claiming a right to "stack" 'n the three policies
issued on each of Mr. Hague's automobiles." Wisconsin law would
not permit the three insurance policies to be "stacked," limiting Mr.
Hague's widow to a maximum recovery of $15,0002"4 Minnesota law,
however, permitted such stacking. In sanctioning the applicability of
Minnesota law despite Wisconsin's overwhelming connection with the
dispute, the Minnesota court relied on Mrs. Hague's permanent
relocation to Minnesota following her husband's death and the fifteen
years during which Mr. Hague commuted to work in Minnesota. 2
Rendering its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed the
choice-of-law issue in light of Professor Leflar's choice-of-law
considerations.12 6 Among other considerations discussed by Prof.
Leflar, the court concluded that Minnesota's state interest would be
substantially furthered by application of its law to the present
controversy.127
While the court recognized Wisconsin's many
substantial contacts with this dispute, the court also noted that
plaintiffs present status as a Minnesota resident created a state
interest in providing her with adequate means to support herself and
ensuring her continued self-sufficiency."
Interestingly, the court also based its decision on the "better law"
consideration advocated by Professor Leflar,'- which argues that in
determining the applicable law, a state court should inquire as to
which law would better serve the "total ends of justice under law."',
Under this analysis the court concluded that allowing the plaintiff to
stack the coverage on her husband's policies would spread the risk of
accidents with uninsured motorists more broadly through insurance
premiums, rather than laying the burden on the unfortunate accident
victim. 1 31 In making this determination, the court took into account
122. "Stacking" here refers to recovery for Mr. Hague's death through each of his
three policies containing coverage for injury by an uninsured motorist. Mr. Hague
was killed when an uninsured motorist rear-ended a motorcycle on which he was a
passenger. Id
123. Id.
124. While the Minnesota court conceded that the status of stacking law in
Wisconsin was not entirely clear, the court saw no reason to deviate from the
Wisconsin court's holding in Nelson v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 217 N.W.2d
670 (Wis. 1974), which upheld limitations on the stacking of insurance policies.
Allstate, 449 US. at 316 n.22.
125. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313-20.
126. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law. 41
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 267 (1966).
127. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1979). affd, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
128. Id.
129. See Leflar, supra note 126. For further discussion of the application of Prof.

Leflar's jurisprudence, see Robert L. Felix, Leflar in the Courts: JudicialAdoptions of
Choice-Influencing Considerations,52 Ark. L. Rev. 35 (1999).
130. Leflar, supra note 126, at 299.
131. Hague,289 N.W.2d at 49.
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the fact that a majority of other jurisdictions had adopted a similar
rule permitting stacking of insurance policies. 132 The Minnesota court
seems to have based the application of its own law not only on that
state's contacts with the parties and the events, but also on policy
considerations that many claim reflect a pro-forum bias in choice-oflaw. 3 3 Although the Minnesota Court's reasoning is of no guidance in
determining the constitutionality of its decision, it is at least
interesting to note its unwillingness to give serious consideration to
the admittedly greater interests of a sister sovereign.
Allstate reached the Supreme Court of the United States for a
determination of whether Minnesota's choice-of-law met
constitutional requirements."
The Court's holding is succinctly
expressed in the proposition that concern for the due process rights of
the defendant required that "for a State's substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have
a significant contact, or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair."'35
The Supreme Court found that the aggregation of Minnesota's
contacts with the litigation provided it with a sufficient interest in the
underlying dispute to justify application of forum law. 36 The Court
further held that since Allstate had a significant business presence in
Minnesota, and familiarity with the law of that jurisdiction, it could
not claim unfair surprise upon the application of Minnesota law to a
dispute between the company and a member of that state's
workforce.'37 Although this line of reasoning has been subject to
extensive scholarly criticism, 3 ' it nonetheless provides a strong
precedent on139 which to base extraterritorial application of state
antitrust law.

This part looked at the areas of law necessarily implicated by a
multistate or nationwide class action by indirect purchasers. Part II
examines a state court decision certifying such a class and considers
132. Id. See also Neil Chamberlin & J. Stephen Holt, Why Arkansas Should
Overturn Its Anti-Stacking Precedent: A Look at Aggregating Uninsured and
UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage,21 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 413 (1999).

133. See Korn, supra note 115, at 796-98.
134. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
135. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate,
449 U.S. at 312-13).
136. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320.
137. Id. at 317-18.
138. See Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 593-95 (4th ed.
2001) [hereinafter Weintraub, Commentary]; Linda Silberman, Can the State of
Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 103 (1981) (arguing that the Court's

decision in Allstate failed to enact meaningful constitutional standards for state
choice-of-law).
139. See Korn, supra note 115, at 798-99.
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the arguments for and against the certification of such a class were it
to include purchasers from states denying indirect purchasers standing
to recover under state antitrust law.
II. OPPOSING ARGUMENTS FOR STATE CERTIFICATION OF INDIRECT
PURCHASER CLASS ACTIONS

A multistate class of indirect purchasers was recently certified in
Tennessee. Robinson v. EMI Music Distribution, Inc.'"' involved a
class action filed in July 1996 in Tennessee Circuit Court on behalf of
CD purchasers from fourteen different states and the District of
Columbia, alleging a price fixing conspiracy by CD manufacturers.
Plaintiffs claimed that manufacturer collusion, in violation of the
antitrust laws of these fourteen states and the District of Columbia,
resulted in artificially inflated retail prices for CDs. ' The Tennessee
Circuit court found that plaintiffs met the requirements for class
treatment under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 42 and
granted conditional certification.'43
Having addressed in the previous section the relevant antitrust
law, 1" and the recent proliferation of antitrust actions filed in state
court,145 this part looks at the advantages as well as the peculiar
problems raised by state courts certifying a multistate or nationwide
class of indirect purchasers.1'4 In doing so, this part attempts to
provide a framework within which to view this decision, taking into
account the viewpoint of the plaintiff and defendant, as well as the
state court system. This part begins with a discussion of the potential
benefits realizable by a state court through application of its law to a
multistate or nationwide class of indirect purchasers. This part then
focuses on an analysis of the constitutional legitimacy of such an
application 147 and concludes wvith a discussion of alternative means

140. Robinson v. EMI Music Distribution Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,510
(Tenn. Cir. CL 1996).
141. Id.
142. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23.01 (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy in order to maintain class treatment,
requirements analogous to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
143. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23.03(1): see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
741 (5th Cir. 1996) (asserting that the purpose of conditional certification is -to
preserve the Court's power to revoke certification in those cases wherein the
magnitude or complexity of the litigation may eventually reveal problems not
theretofore apparent' (quoting In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir.
1974))); see also Note, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and
the Limits of Rule 23, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1996) (discussing the use of conditional
certification for purposes of settlement classes in federal courts).
144. See supra Part I.A.
145. See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
146. See infra Part II.A.
147. See infra Part II.B.
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through which a state court might apply its law to a multistate or
nationwide class despite constitutional limitations. 4 8
A. DiscretionaryFactorsInfluencing the CertificationDecision
Despite class satisfaction of threshold statutory and jurisdictional
requirements for class treatment described above, a state court is not
required to grant class certification. 149 Congested state court dockets
and scarce judicial resources demand that state courts give serious
consideration to efficiency concerns in determining the desirability of
adjudicating a class action.'
This holds especially true in the context
of a nationwide class action, as such a move would employ the state's
resources for the benefit of non-citizens.1 5 1 This also holds true in the
Robinson case described above, because plaintiffs hailed from a
number of states other than Tennessee.
When contemplating
certification, a state court will almost certainly inquire regarding the
benefits that class certification might generate for the forum state.
Essentially, this calculus may become one of utility for the state court.
If the court determines that the benefits achieved through certification
outweigh the resources expended in handling such a dispute, the court
would be prone to certify. A plaintiff's goal, then, would be to
convince the court of the efficiency gains ostensibly resulting from
certification.
1. Rule 23(b)(3) and the Desirability or Undesirability of Conducting
the Litigation in a Particular Forum
An initial argument in favor of certification highlights the
substantial justice that may be achieved through class treatment.'52
Employing an argument based on the equities of the situation, the
interests of justice require the provision of coordinated relief to
persons injured as a result of an illegal practice.'53 This line of
148. See infra Part II.C.
149. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring a court considering certification to find
that "a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy").
150. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts: Grace Under Pressure: New York Judges
Manage Large and Diverse Docket, N.Y. L.J, Jan. 24, 1994, at S-I (praising the work
of state courts in the face of congested dockets and minimal resources).
151. This statement contemplates indirect purchasers who neither reside, nor made
the relevant purchases, in the forum state bringing suit against an out-of-state
defendant. If either plaintiff or defendant is found to have a more substantial
connection with the forum state, this analysis may not apply.
152. At least one commentator has noted the more cynical possibility that a state
court may certify simply out of a desire for prestige. See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 461, 476 (2000).
153. See Abraham J. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Action-Has Their
Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. Law. 1259, 1259-60 (1970) (noting that the class
action device has provided a means of redress for "an endless variety of consumer
wrongs" and calling the class action "one of the most socially useful remedies in
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argument is strengthened by the policy goals intended by Rule 23,11
which envision the collective resolution of claims of a similar nature in
a single proceeding, rather than requiring each injured party to file a
separate suit.'55 Coordinating indirect purchaser litigation in a single
state would yield a tremendous gain in efficiency since purchasers in
each state would not be required to file a separate action in their
respective state courts.'5 6
Additionally, one may note the justice achieved by providing a
meaningful possibility of relief for indirect purchasers from states
without a sufficient number of purchasers to merit an independent
class action."5
While success in this line of argument would
necessarily represent an altruistic motivation on the part of larger
states that would likely have a sufficient number of indirect
purchasers, the reverse would be true if the forum state has an
insufficient number of plaintiffs. In such a case, a court may find a
benefit to its own plaintiffs through the attachment of plaintiffs from
other states in order to meet the numerosity requirement for
maintenance of a class action.Iss For example, the Shutts court
correctly found the main benefit of class treatment to be the
possibility of a grant of relief to plaintiffs with claims too menial to
merit individual litigation. In Shutts, those class members hailing from
Texas and Oklahoma would have had the resources to mount
independent class actions, but plaintiffs from abroad, or even those in
states with smaller numbers of plaintiffs, Kansas possibly included,
would be left without a practical remedy. Stressing this point, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted "this lawsuit involves claims
averaging about $100 per plaintiff; most of the plaintiffs would have
no realistic day in court if a class action were not available." ' -9
Such a consideration appears important if the vindication of
consumer rights is to be taken at all seriously. The idea that a
manufacturer might market overpriced goods with impunity in a given
state simply due to the relative paucity of consumers located there
offends basic notions of substantial justice."t

history").
154. See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
155. See Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 72 (4th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter Wright].
156. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 35-36 (examining the possibilities for
coordination of indirect purchaser litigation). While this action would presumably
favor plaintiffs, the opt-out requirement announced in Shuts would preserve an
individual plaintiffs right to file suit in another jurisdiction, such as plaintiff's home
state.
157. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring that in order to merit class action
treatment the number of plaintiffs must be such that joinder is impracticable).

158. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,809 (1985).
159. Id
160. See id.
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On its face, this argument carries tremendous equitable force, yet
proponents of judicial economy might regard this as too high a cost
for a questionable benefit.161 If class members hail primarily from the
forum state, critics may be heard to argue that inclusion of foreign
plaintiffs only serves to expend the judicial resources of the forum
state for the benefit of non-citizens and local attorneys. 162 If domestic
plaintiffs require additional claimants in order to merit class
treatment, the forum state may object that the adjudication of a large
class action is simply too costly an undertaking for the benefit of a
small group of citizens. 63
2. Protection of State Interests as Motivation to Certify a Multistate or
Nationwide Class of Indirect Purchasers
A second potential benefit prompting a state court to certify is the4
possible vindication and protection of important state interests.)
Constructing an argument on this basis, two notable state interests
may be asserted as conceivably protected by certification; (1)
protection of state citizens from violations of antitrust law, 65 and (2)
regulation and protection of an industry with special significance to
the forum state."6 If certification of a class and the subsequent
adjudication of a class action would serve to protect these important
state interests in a meaningful way, a state court would seize the
opportunity.
3. Determination of Applicable Law
Most importantly, however, a state court should inquire into the
substantive law applicable to the class. 67 This consideration takes on
tremendous weight here because the determination of the applicable
law will necessarily inform the court's ability to avail itself of the
potential benefits previously discussed. If, through a choice-of-law
161. See infra notes 310-12 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 303-15 and accompanying text.
163. See Osborne v. Subaru of America Inc., 243 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825-26 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (explaining that entertaining a class action would not promote concerns of
judicial economy).
164. See Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between
State and FederalLaw, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1315 (1981) (discussing construction of state

interests which form the basis for application of forum law). But see John Hart Ely,
Choice of Law and the State's Interest in ProtectingIts Own, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.

173, 180 (1981) (contesting the assertion that a state's primary interest in a multistate

dispute is the protection of its own citizens and regarding it as "wishful thinking").
165. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
166. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text (providing examples of
situations in which a state court would perceive a state interest to be protected

through application of forum law).
167. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (stressing
the importance of ascertaining the applicable law prior to making a decision on
certification, especially when the laws of more than one jurisdiction may apply).
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analysis, a court determines that forum law is applicable to the entire
class, the substantial justice and efficiency gains envisioned by the
court would be readily realizable. Further, application of forum law
would allow for protection of state interests. t ' Conversely, if a court
determines that it must apply the laws of other interested jurisdictions,
any efficiency gains would be largely mooted because the court would
almost certainly be forced to make use of subclasses, which in turn
would require numerous duplicative proceedings analogous to
separate filings in each individual state. 69 In sum, a petition for
certification establishing class-wide applicability of forum law would
seem to have a much greater chance of success, since it would
facilitate the realization of the potential benefits attendant to class
certification. 7 °

B. The ConstitutionalQuestion
Given the precedent set forth by the Tennessee court in
Robinson, could a plaintiff class of indirect purchasers establish a
sufficient connection between the forum state and the entire plaintiff
class to justify class-wide application of forum law under the standard
set by Allstate? This section attempts to extend the choice-of-law
inquiry laid out in the previous section and explores lines of argument
available to both plaintiffs and defendants in arguing either for or
against the application of forum law to the entire plaintiff class, with a
focus on the constitutional mandates regarding choice-of-law. As
noted earlier the success or failure of these arguments will be a critical
factor in a court's certification decision."
1. Establishing Compliance with the "Contacts Creating Interests"
Requirement of Allstate InsuranceCo. v. Hague
As discussed in Part I, the Supreme Court's choice-of-law
jurisprudence requires that before a state may apply its own law to a
multistate class, that state must establish some contact with the
underlying dispute that creates a cognizable interest on the part of the
forum state."
Using the Robinson case 74 as a paradigm, if a
168. See infra note 231 and accompanying text (describing how protection of state

interests is a central factor in choice-of-law inquiries).
169. See Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 648, 671 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (describing
the difficulties attendant to class treatment when individual issues figure prominently
and concluding that class treatment would be inefficient).
170. See infra Part II.B.
171. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
174. Robinson v. EMI Music Distribution, Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,510
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1996). While the class certified in Robinson included only plaintiffs
from states with established Illinois Brick repealer statutes, this Note attempts to
address the question of whether a future multistate class of indirect purchasers could
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nationwide class of indirect purchasers petitioned the Tennessee court
to apply its own law to the case so as to affect the largest possible
recovery, could that state establish a sufficient connection with nonresidents who purchased their CDs in other states?
Any attempt to establish forum contact with the dispute begins with
the contention that although the activity complained of occurred
primarily in other states, that conduct had foreseeable consequences
within the forum state. 175 In the case of a potential nationwide class of
indirect purchasers seeking certification in state court, it may be
argued that CD sales to non-residents taking place outside of the state
have a perceptible effect on the prices of CDs within the forum state,
creating legitimate contact between the forum and the entire plaintiff
class. 176
Bolstering this contention is the fact that the same
manufacturer marketing the offending products in other states also
sells the same products to Tennessee residents in Tennessee. If
successful in this claim, plaintiffs would proceed to establish the
presence of state interests based on this contact. 1" The primary state
interest asserted here would be the protection of state residents
against the collusive practices of manufacturers operating in the forum
state. 78 Application of forum law would vindicate this interest by
subjecting out-of-state transactions to the same protective standard
governing domestic transactions.
This line of argument takes on added force in cases purporting to
regulate a business having special economic significance to the forum
state. 179 In such a case, forum interests would be especially strong
since industry practices may have a significant impact on the economic
well-being of the forum state. In a Robinson paradigm, plaintiffs may
include purchasers from states without such statutes or states expressly rejecting a
right of recovery for indirect purchasers.
175. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding California's

exercise of personal jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company having no physical
presence in California but purposely engaged in business with a California resident);

United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding
Japanese corporation criminally liable for violations of the Sherman Act even though
all alleged violations took place outside of the United States).

176. This line of argument was quite similar to that relied upon by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Hague v. Allstate Insurance Co., 289 N.W.2d 43 (Minn. 1978),
which held that plaintiff's residence in Minnesota permits that state to maintain an
interest in ensuring her self-sufficiency.
177. See id.
178. A Florida Appellate court recently expressed this state interest in Renaissance
Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), a nationwide class

action by purchasers of cruise line tickets alleging fraudulent assessment of port
charges. The Florida appellate court upheld application of Florida law to the entire
plaintiff class and upheld the district court's finding that "Florida has a great interest
in protecting people dealing with corporations doing business within Florida." Id. at
438.

179. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985) (citing the
importance of natural gas production as an industry in Kansas, as a possible

connection through which to justify application of forum law).
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point to the importance of the music business to bolster this
contention. 180
A more significant hurdle to potential plaintiffs may lie in the
necessary demonstration that universal application of forum law is
"neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." ' Plaintiffs argument
would begin with the assertion that it cannot be "unfair surprise""
when the substantive law of a single state in which the defendant is
engaged in business activities is applied to a dispute to which they are
party.18 Defendants marketing their product in every state at least
implicitly accept the laws of that jurisdiction as acceptable regulations
of business conduct.'8
Furthermore, by all appearances
manufacturers do not rely on their presumptive immunity from suit by
indirect purchasers in making marketing decisions. They were most
likely marketing through a uniform nationwide pricing scheme, rather
than requiring purchasers in certain states to pay a premium for the
right of recovery.
Moreover, a defendant's claim of reliance on immunity from suit by
indirect purchasers is highly suspect. Surely a manufacturer engaged
in nationwide commerce realizes that products sold within a given
state are often purchased by individuals from another state, resulting
in the creation of choice-of-law interests in two separate states. In
such a case, a manufacturer cannot be sure which law would govern,'5
and simple percentages186 inform us that one of the states most likely
affords indirect purchasers a right of recovery.

180. See N'ville Music Biz Puts $1.2 Bil Into State, Billboard, Aug. 3, 1991, at 37
(reporting that the entertainment industry in Tennessee accounts for an annual
revenue of $2.5 billion and employs approximately 18,000 people). There is no doubt
that the Florida court in Glassman had a strong incentive to apply Florida law to the
entire plaintiff class, so as to protect the cruise line industry.
181. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). For a more detailed
discussion of the distinction between arbitrary and unfair in this context, see
Weintraub, Commentary, supra note 138, at 595.
182. See Weintraub, Commentary, supra note 138, at 595.
183. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 316 n.22 (discussing possible claims of reliance by
Allstate, the Court noted that "reliance by the insurer that Wisconsin law would
necessarily govern any accident that occurred in Wisconsin, or that the law of another
jurisdiction would necessarily govern any accident that did not occur in Wisconsin,
would be unwarranted").
184. Id. at 317-18.
185. A possible means of circumventing ambiguity in applicable law would be to
condition purchase of the product on acceptance of a choice-of-law clause,
presumably included in the packaging.
186. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
187. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 316 n.22. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
noted that since a majority of states prohibited stacking at the time of the accident
"Allstate could not have expected that an anti-stacking rule would govern any
particular accident in which the insured might be involved and thus cannot claim
unfair surprise from the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of forum law."
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A pertinent example of the failure of this type of reliance claim can
be seen in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc."8 In Keeton, the plaintiff,
a New York resident, filed suit in a New Hampshire federal court
against Hustler magazine alleging that she had been libeled in recent
issues of the magazine. 189 Both the district court and the court of
appeals dismissed the case, reasoning that New Hampshire had too
small an interest in adjudicating the claims of a non-citizen for injuries
occurring primarily outside of that state, especially when the
defendant had such a small presence in the state. Despite the
admittedly small circulation of Hustler in New Hampshire, 190 the
Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding Hustler subject to
personal jurisdiction in New Hampshire.191 The Court's ruling,
although explicitly disavowing parallel application to choice-of-law
inquiries,1" indicates something about the extent of a state's ability to
adjudicate what is essentially a nationwide controversy, based on its
own standards. By providing the plaintiff a forum in New Hampshire,
the Court at least left the door open for the adjudication of the claim
according to New Hampshire law, despite the fact that only a small
portion of the injury actually occurred in that state. 93
Despite the Court's refusal to discuss choice-of-law considerations,
the decision in Keeton has serious implications in that area. Like most
states New Hampshire follows the "single publication rule,"1 94 which
permits recovery for each instance of communication through a single
cause of action. In this case the communication was nationwide. 195
Application of the single publication rule would thus permit the
plaintiff to recover for communication to persons in other states,
ignoring the possibility that other states afford varying substantive
rights to plaintiffs pressing such claims. The Court's decision then
may be read as tacit approval of application of forum law to injuries
occurring primarily outside of the forum state. If this reading of

188. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
189. Id. at 772 (noting that New Hampshire was the only state in which the statute
of limitations would not have barred her claim).
190. Id. (pointing out that Hustler sells between 10,000 and 15,000 copies in New
Hampshire each month).
191. Id. at 773-74.
192. Id. at 778 (dismissing choice-of-law concerns as irrelevant to the question of
personal jurisdiction over defendant).
193. See Debra R. Cohen, The Single PublicationRule: One Action, Not One Law,
62 Brook. L. Rev. 921, 942-43 (1996).
194. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A cmt. b (1977) (explaining that the
single publication rule serves to avoid a barrage of lawsuits in cases where "the same
communication is heard at the same time by two or more persons," thus giving rise to
a single cause of action). New Hampshire's adherence to that rule has been
established by Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 549 A.2d 1187 (N.H. 1988), rev'd, 465
U.S. 770 (1994). For further discussion of the single publication rule and its relation
to choice-of-law considerations see, Cohen, supra note 193, at 929-43.
195. Keeton, 549 A.2d at 1193.
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Keeton is accepted, it heralds an unsympathetic response to claims of
reliance by the publisher.
It may further be argued on this basis that a business decision made
on the basis of the protective character of a particular state's law fails
to insulate business transactions from scrutiny under a less favorable
law. 196 The holding in Allstate may plausibly be read as failing to
establish that physical localization has a preclusionary effect on
contacts with, or interests of, other states. 19' That is, even if a
manufacturer localized operations in one state, relying on the
protection of that state's laws, if foreseeable effects of his conduct are
felt in other states, the law of those other states may be applied to a
resultant dispute. Given this precedent, interstate effects in a case
such as Robinson would be that much easier to establish since the
manufacturer markets its product nationwide.
To summarize, application of forum law to a nationwide class of
indirect purchasers will be constitutional if plaintiffs can demonstrate
that manufacturer conduct had foreseeable effects within the forum
state, despite defendant's claim of reliance on more favorable state
law.
2. Distinguishing the Multistate Indirect Purchaser Paradigm from the
Court's Holding in Shutts
The Supreme Court revisited the choice-of-law issue in Shttts

to

determine whether Kansas's application of forum law to the entire
plaintiff class met the constitutional requirements as announced in
Allstate. In its review of the Kansas Supreme Court's decision, the
Court implemented a two-step process, based on the Due Process
Clause' and Full Faith and Credit Clause2 Oto refine and apply the
Allstate standard. 201 First, the Court established the presence of an
apparent conflict between the applicable Kansas law and that of other
states in which the leases were located.' Absent such a conflict the
choice-of-law question would be moot. Application of Kansas law in
such a case would offend neither the due process concerns of the
196. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302. 316-18 (1981) (indicating that
Allstate could have anticipated that either Wisconsin or Minnesota law could apply to
a car accident occurring in Wisconsin).
197. See id198. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,814-23 (1985).
199. U.S. Const. amend. V.
200. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
201. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818-23.
202. Id. at 816-18 (establishing the possibility that laws of Oklahoma and Texas,
states containing a significant portion of the leased lands, may not impose liability for
interest on suspended oil and gas royalties and that, should such liability be
established, the applicable interest rate would be lower than under Kansas law); see
Okla. Const. art XIV, § 2 (setting the maximum interest rate at six percent for
contracts in which an interest rate is otherwise unspecified).
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defendant, nor the policy considerations of other states because the
same result would ultimately obtain regardless of which law applied. 3
Second, the Supreme Court proceeded to find that Kansas lacked
sufficient contact with non-resident plaintiffs, whose land was located
outside of the state, to justify application of Kansas law to the claims
of those plaintiffs.2°
Through its reversal of Kansas' application of forum law, the
Supreme Court apparently established boundaries for a state's choiceof-law.0 5 While the Court laid the groundwork for this holding
through the standard announced in Allstate, it had yet to provide a
tangible example of the failure of state interests to meet that standard.
Shutts ostensibly defines this boundary through its refusal to sanction
class-wide application of Kansas law.20 6 Therefore, it may be argued
that Shutts provides a more applicable precedent for current purposes
than does Allstate.2°
Upon closer examination, however, Shutts may not be as significant
a decision in delineating the boundaries of choice-of-law as it might
appear. Allstate and several other notable choice-of-law cases were
based on interpretation of contracts 2l and employee benefits;219
Shutts, however, centered on what was essentially a land-based
dispute.210 In such cases, traditional choice-of-law principles have
established an enduring practice of applying the law of the situs of the
land.211 Shutts may have been decided as it was simply because of its
relation to that strong legal principle. Although the task of the Court
in Shutts was not to determine which state or states had the greatest
interest in adjudicating this controversy according to its laws but
rather whether Kansas had sufficient contacts and interests to do so,
203. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 816.
204. Id. at 822. In those cases, plaintiff had absolutely no material contact with
Kansas other than the fact that suit was initiated there on their behalf, a factor which
the Court specifically noted as failing to influence a determination as to permissible
choice-of-law. Id. at 815.
205. See Weintraub, Commentary, supra note 138, at 602.

206. See id.
207. See James R. Safley & Bethany D. Krueger, Shutts Meets the Baby Shermans:
Considerations Affecting Choice of Federal or State Court for the Prosecution of

Antitrust Class Actions, 2 Sedona Conf. J. (Fall 2001) (discussing the idea of a
multistate class of indirect purchasers with direct reference to Shutts as controlling
precedent).

208. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,309-12 (1981).
209. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)

(upholding California's refusal to enforce a choice-of-law clause requiring application
of Alaska law to a contract between a non-resident alien and a California resident, as
contrary to the public policy of the state of California).
210. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
211. Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws §§ 214-231 (1934); see also Robby
Alden, Note, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
585, 587 (1987) (characterizing the lex situs approach to choice-of-law in land disputes

as "anachronistic in an era of minimum contacts and interest analysis, and
constitutionally intolerable in some instances").
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one cannot ignore the possibility that some sort of weighing analysis
figured in the Court's decision. In effect, the Court decided Shutts as
it did, not because of the lack of contacts with Kansas, but rather
because of the overwhelming contacts and interests of sister states
wherein the majority of the leases were located. If this reading is
correct, Shutts may leave the door open for application of forum law
in cases like Allstate, in which the dispute has a less intimate
connection to an individual state. In this sense Shutts does not signal a
marked change in the Court's attitude towards choice-of-law.1 2
Despite Shutts's apparent restriction on application of forum law, it
may still be constitutionally permissible for a state court to apply its
law to an213 entire multistate or nationwide class of indirect
purchasers.
Central to plaintiff's goal of establishing the constitutionality of
class-wide application of forum law is the ability to distinguish the
multistate or nationwide indirect purchaser class action from the
Supreme Court's holding in Shutts, which apparently limits a state
court's power to apply its own law to an entire multistate class.2 14 The
foregoing examination of both Shutts and Allstate, however, provides
some basis for arguing that class-wide application of forum law to a
multistate or nationwide class of indirect purchasers may withstand a
constitutional challenge despite the holding in Shutts.
C. Alternate Groundsfor Application of Forum Law to The Multistate
Class of Indirect Purchasers
Should a state court reject the constitutionality of class-wide
application of forum law, several options remain through which a state
court may nonetheless afford a remedy to a nationwide class of
indirect purchasers. This section examines such "back doors" and
212. See Torchiana, supra note 111, at 918 (characterizing Shutts as rendering
Allstate applicable in a class action context).
213. City of St. Paul v. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 7[ 69,305, at 65,418

(D. Minn. 1990) (holding that "the claims of foreign purchasers against foreign
defendants simply have no meaningful contact with Minnesota"). But see Safley &
Krueger, supra note 207, at 105. (concluding that "[i]n these situations, it would be
very difficult for the forum to find that it had an interest in applying its law to the
claims of out-of-state plaintiffs").
214. See supra notes 100-139 and accompanying text. An initial barrier to
application of forum antitrust law to a multistate class may be the presence of state
decisions relegating the application of state antitrust, or comparable law, to intrastate
violations. See Blake v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 1996-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,369 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1996) (restricting application of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act to
intrastate violations); see also OCE Printing Sys. USA, Inc. v. Mailers Data Services,
Inc., 760 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (decertifying a class seeking
recovery under the Florida Unfair Trade Act on the theory that the Florida Act was
"enacted to protect in-state consumers"); Jurisdictionand Procedure. Florida Court
Overturns Certification of Three Nationwide Antitrust Classes, 79 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 90 (July 28, 2000) (explaining that Florida antitrust law expresses
an intent to regulate only intrastate commerce).
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describes how courts have utilized these options to circumvent choiceof-law restrictions.
1. The False Conflict Approach
Assuming defendant successfully establishes Shutts as an applicable
precedent governing a multistate class of indirect purchasers, an
argument for class-wide application of forum law can be maintained
on the basis of an absence of a real conflict of laws. 15 Upon remand
of Shutts, the Kansas court was required to submit the competing
bodies of law to a conflicts analysis to determine whether or not the
law of any other jurisdiction having an interest in this case presented a
real conflict2 6 with the applicable Kansas law. 17 In doing so, the
Kansas court determined that there was in fact no real conflict of law
as other interested states would arrive 2at18 the same result as would
obtain through application of Kansas law.
In this sense, the Kansas court seemingly exploited the loophole
pointed out by Justice Stevens's concurrence in Shutts, 2 19 which
stressed the necessity for an established conflict between applicable
laws before a state court was required to defer to the law of another
state. This allowed the Kansas court significant leeway in its
interpretation of competing law with the resultant determination that
there was in fact no conflict at all."0
The same result in a similar case led Justice O'Connor to criticize
this formula as providing too much latitude for a state court to
construct a permissible rationale justifying application of forum law.
She noted that in order to avoid application of another state's law, a
forum state:
need only take two steps in order to avoid applying it. First, invent a
legal theory so novel or strange that the other State has never had
an opportunity to reject it; then, on the basis of nothing but
215. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
216. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823-24, (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Real conflict" here is used in the same
sense as used by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in Shutis. That is, Justice
Stevens distinguishes a real conflict, defined as a situation in which the application of
forum law would result in a materially different outcome than through application of
the law of another interested state, from a false conflict, defined as a situation in
which the law of the forum appears to be in conflict with that of other interested
states, but which may be reconciled upon closer analysis. See id. at 838 & n.20.
217. Id. at 818 (noting that decisions and statutes from other states in which oil and
gas leases were located present a colorable conflict with the applicable Kansas law).
218. Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 732 P.2d 1286, 1293-1312 (Kan. 1987)
(holding that other states, following Kansas rule, would allow recovery for interest
withheld on royalties, but applying the statutory interest rate of each state to the
leases located in that state), affd in part and rev'd in part,472 U.S. 797 (1985).
219. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 823-824 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
220. See Shutts, 732 P.2d at 1293-312.
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unsupported speculation, "predict"
221 that the other State would adopt
that theory if it had the chance.
Several commentators have echoed Justice O'Connor's sentiment
that the failure of the Court to invoke meaningful constitutional
constraints on a state's choice-of-law has left the door open to
substantial pro-forum bias.'
Despite Justice O'Connor's vehement criticism, demonstrating the
absence of a conflict of laws may remain a viable option for a plaintiff
seeking uniform application of forum law. Namely, through an
inventive reading of the antitrust statutes of other states, a state court
may determine that other states would reach the same result as the
forum state, thus avoiding the presence of a conflict altogether. This
avenue was exactly the one taken by the Kansas court on remand of
the Shutts case through2 which Kansas finally applied its own law to
most issues in the case.m
In an antitrust context, however, a state court would be hard
pressed to gloss over a conflict between state antitrust laws in order to
justify application of forum law to an entire multistate class of indirect
purchasers. Variations in the explicit statutory language of state
antitrust laws are abundant. 224 Some statutes purport to provide
protection for defendants against multiple liability to both direct and
indirect purchasers.
Statutes also vary on the question of
assessment of damages. While many states follow the federal rule
allowing for recovery of treble damages plus attorney's fees,n others
set a fixed amount in addition to actual damages. -' 7 Statutes further
vary as to whom the grant of standing extends. Some state statutes
grant standing to any persons injured," while others are far more
restrictive. 9 Given this wide array, it may be difficult to apply the
221. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,749 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
222. See Korm, supra note 115, at 786-87; Miller & Crump, supra note 84, at 61
(labeling this the "false 'false conflict"' and stating that "[the conflict is real, but it
disappears because the forum says that it does"); Shreve. supra note 114, at 271-72.
223. Shutts, 732 P.2d at 1291-92.
224. See Cohen & Lawson, supra note 68, at 30. (illustrating the myriad variations
in state antitrust law which complicate coordination of indirect purchaser claims on a
multistate or national level); see also 6-7 Julian 0. von Kalinowski et al., Antitrust
Laws and Trade Regulation (2d ed. 2001) (summarizing the antitrust law of each
state).
225. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325D.57 (West 1995) (establishing that -[i]n any
subsequent action arising from the same conduct, the court may take any steps
necessary to avoid duplicative recovery against a defendant").
226. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16750(a) (West 1997); D.C. Code Ann. § 284508(a) (Lexis 2001).
227. See Ala. Code § 6-5-60(a) (1993) (allowing indirect purchasers to recover
actual damages plus $500); Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-9 (1999).
228. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-801(b) (1994).
229. See e.g., Md. Code Ann., Com. Law I § 11-209(b)(2)(ii) (Lexis 2000)
(providing that only "[t]he United States, the State, or any political subdivision
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law of the forum state to the entire class on the basis of a failure to
establish a material conflict.
Most importantly, however, seventeen states afford no remedy at all
to indirect purchasers. 2" The absence of a remedy in such states
seems to present an insurmountable conflict. A forum state would be
hard pressed to avoid such a conflict through inventive jurisprudence
and apply forum law to the entire class. Nor could a plaintiff
convincingly argue for class-wide application of forum law based on
the absence of other states' interest in the dispute. Engaging in an
interest analysis 2 1 seems to lead to the same result. The policy behind
most state laws denying a remedy to indirect purchasers is to
"maintain and promote economic competition in trade and
commerce," 232 presumably by protecting corporate defendants. To
that end such laws are often subject to an interpretive maxim
guaranteeing their harmonization with federal antitrust law.233 In such
cases, application of forum law allowing recovery would offend both
due process concerns because manufacturers could credibly claim
reliance on their immunity from indirect purchaser suit in that state,
as well as Full Faith and Credit Clause concerns, because application
of recovery law would conceivably harm the policy goal of protecting
a state's corporate citizens.
2. Assignment of Procedural Status to the Grant of Remedy
Lastly, a plaintiff may accept application of the substantive law of
other states to the case but nonetheless insist on application of the
forum state's procedural law. A plaintiff would then argue for
assignation of procedural status to the remedy, thus circumventing the
lack of a right of recovery in other states. Although quite antiquated,
and unlikely to be argued in a modern court, there are numerous
examples of state and federal courts employing a distinction between
right and remedy, ostensibly in order to provide a more generous
recovery than would be available in the alternate forum.2
organized under the authority of this State" has standing to sue as an indirect
purchaser); see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-12(a), (g) (Lexis 1985) (providing that only

the attorney general, acting in a parenspatriaecapacity, shall have the power to bring
an indirect purchaser action).
230. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
231. Although a protracted discussion of interest analysis in a choice-of-law context
goes well beyond the scope of this Note, the basic premise of interest analysis is that
choice-of-law should be based on a determination of which jurisdiction's policies
would be most furthered through application of its law to the present dispute. For a

much more thorough and intelligent discussion, see Brainerd Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 227
(1958).
232. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.04 (Vernon 1987).
233. Id.
234. For a general discussion of this area, see Robert A. Leflar et al., American
Conflicts Law § 126 (4th ed. 1986); see also Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat'l Bank,

2002]

GOOD "BRICK" WALLS

2049

In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, -5 the Supreme Court upheld
application of a forum state's statute of limitations despite the fact
that the forum lacked sufficient contact with the dispute to justify
application of its substantive law. In its opinion, the Court
distinguished the presence of a right from the necessity of granting a
remedy, noting "the bar of the statute does not extinguish the
underlying right but merely causes the remedy to be withheld ... the
forum may choose to allow its courts to provide a remedy, even
though the jurisdiction where the right arose would not."' z
The implications of this reasoning for a nationwide class of indirect
purchasers are sweeping. Accepting the fact that price fixing is illegal
inevery jurisdiction, 2 7 a state court need only decide to afford a
remedy to injured consumers. A state court predisposed to provide a
remedy to indirect purchasers may assign procedural status to the
remedy, circumventing the substantive law of other jurisdictions. This
sort of judicial maneuver would almost certainly be met with claims of
justified reliance on the protective character of other states' laws. A
defendant would be unlikely, however, to find a court sympathetic to
a claim that reliance on presumptive immunity from suit by indirect
purchasers should justify impunity for an admittedly illegal course of
conduct.
With primary focus on a constitutional framework, this part has
outlined various arguments available to both plaintiffs and defendants
in effecting a determination regarding the applicability of forum law
to the entire plaintiff class.
III. THE FAILURE OF THE MULTISTATE CLASS TO PROVIDE AN
EFFICIENT MEANS OF CONSUMER REDRESS

This part proceeds to further analyze the arguments set forth in Part
II, evaluates their relative chances of success, and argues that in light
of the general failure of those arguments in favor of multistate or
nationwide certification, a state should not certify a nationwide class
of indirect purchasers due to both statutory and pragmatic concerns.
Additional consideration is given to the potential for abuse presented
by many antitrust class actions. Finally, this part attempts, through
several illustrative examples, to provide a framework within which to
analyze the certification decision.
98 N.W. 918, 922 (1904) (holding that "under all authorities the character and extent
of the remedy is governed by the law of the forum").
235. 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
236. Id at 725; see also Graves v. Graves' Ex'rs, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 207, 208-09 (1810)
(distinguishing the presence of a right from the presence of a remedy); Kilberg v.

Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961) (characterizing a remedy as
procedural, thus avoiding less favorable statutory recovery limit in place under
Massachusetts law).
237. See supra notes 225-29.
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A. A PrudentialArgument Against Class-Wide Application of Forum
Law
Despite CD purchasers' legitimate grievance against the music
industry, other concerns outweigh allowing vindication through
multistate or nationwide class actions. Conceding for the moment the
possible constitutionality of class-wide application of forum law, there
remains a powerful argument that a state should not avail itself of its
full range of power in this manner. Such a prudential argument
against class certification calls into question the wisdom of a state's
availment of the wide constitutional boundaries seemingly established
by Allstate. Although it is not my intention to restate the extensive
body of scholarly criticism surrounding the Allstate decision,218 further
analysis will demonstrate the negative consequences that may flow
from a full-blown application of the standard announced therein.
Examination of Allstate reveals that Minnesota's interests in the
underlying dispute were minimal. 239 The fact that the deceased
commuted to work in Minnesota appears too tenuous a contact
through which to establish an interest in the litigation on the part of
that state.241 This is especially true in light of the fact that all of his
cars were garaged and registered in Wisconsin, and the accident was
entirely unrelated to Mr. Hague's employment.2 41
Furthermore, plaintiff's post-accident move to Minnesota seems a
rather tenuous connection on which to base application of Minnesota
law.' 2 Plaintiff's post-accident move may be a contact with the
litigation, but it certainly should not form a cognizable interest on
which to base application of forum law. Even if we accept, as the
Court did, plaintiff's relocation as unrelated to the litigation, the
application of Minnesota law runs counter to the announced principle
of avoiding an arbitrary element in choice-of-law. Justice Powell
expressed this sentiment in dissent, noting "[i]f a plaintiff could
choose the substantive rules to be applied to an action by moving to a
hospitable forum, the invitation to forum shopping would be
irresistible. Moreover, it would permit the.., choice-of-law question
to turn on a post-accrual circumstance. "243
By legitimating
Minnesota's application of forum law, the Court effectively

238. See generally Symposium, Conflict-of-Laws Theory After Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 1 (1981).
239. See Russell J. Weintraub, Who's Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law?, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 17, 31 (1981).
240. Id. at 28-29.
241. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,314,315 n.21 (1980).
242. The Minnesota court, however, found plaintiff's post-accident move to
Minnesota unrelated to the litigation. See Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43,
47 (1979).
243. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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announced that a contract may be interpreted under the law of any
state that can obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant."v
Analysis of Allstate seems to reveal that whenever a state can assert
judicial jurisdiction over a controversy, it may, with little resistance,
assert legislative jurisdiction as well. Given the precedent set by
Allstate, it seems clear that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to
employ constitutional constraints on a state's choice-of-law. The
result, as seen above, is a strong bias in favor of forum law, with little
hope of accountability to the demands of the Constitution. 25
Indeed, Professor Harold Korn notes that what few constraints the
Court has managed to place on a state's choice-of-law have been
accomplished through restrictions on judicial rather than legislative
jurisdiction.2'

In the celebrated case of Rush v. Savchuk,.247 the

Supreme Court held that a Minnesota court could not exercise judicial
jurisdiction over a suit by an injured passenger against the driver's
insurance company when Minnesota's only contact with the dispute
was the insurance company's business presence in the state. Had the
Court not reversed Minnesota's exercise of jurisdiction, the
application of Minnesota law would have had sweeping implications
for the nature of our federal system.24 In cases involving insurance
companies or other entities doing business nationwide, the Minnesota
court's holding would have allowed a plaintiff to file suit against the
company in any jurisdiction and apply the law of that jurisdiction,
regardless of the location of the accident or the residence of the
insured.24 9 This result would have had the practical effect of impairing
a state's ability to effectively govern contracts through the application
of state law.
B. Failureof Class-Wide Application of Forum Law to Meet the
Demands of the Constitution
Despite the Supreme Court's history of significant deference to
state legislative jurisdiction,5 0 application of forum law to a multistate
class of indirect purchasers would almost surely exceed the bounds of
constitutionality. Notwithstanding the apparently significant effects of
nationwide antitrust violations within a particular state, application of
forum law to an entire indirect purchaser class would render the
substantive policies of sister states entirely ineffectual. The "magnet
forum" problem 1 would become an instant reality. Plaintiff's
244. See Korn, supra note 115, at 798.
245. See Shreve, supra note 114, at 271.

246. See Korn, supra note 115, at 786-87.

247. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
248. See Korn, supra note 115, at 793-94.
249. Savchuk v. Rush, 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).

250. See Weintraub, Commentary, supra note 138, at 596-600.
251. See Miller & Crump, supra note 84, at 57 (arguing that allowing a state court
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attorneys would feel bound to file suit in the jurisdiction with the most
favorable law, thus evading the policies and restrictions of the
plaintiff's home state. Additionally, application of forum law to a
Robinson type of class action would place a tremendous strain on the
due process rights of defendants. No longer could a defendant expect
purposeful conduct in one state to be judged according to the laws of
that state. 2 Instead, a corporate defendant would have to proceed
under the assumption that all conduct will be judged under that state
law most favorable to the plaintiff. These two by-products of an
overly permissive choice-of-law doctrine, the magnet forum problem
and potential due process violations, were exactly those the Court
sought to avoid through restriction of judicial jurisdiction in cases such
as Rush v. Savchuk.53
At least one federal court has explicitly rejected the contention that
a state can establish sufficient contact with indirect purchasers in
other states to justify the application of that state's law.24 City of St.
Paul v. FMC Corp.2" involved a class action filed on behalf of
municipalities nationwide, alleging price-fixing by chlorine and caustic
soda producers in violation of both federal and state antitrust law. On
a motion to limit the application of Minnesota's antitrust law to
Minnesota purchasers, the Court proceeded through a Shutts analysis
and found a conflict between Minnesota's antitrust law and that of
other involved states.2 6 The court, however, refused to give serious
consideration to the second prong of the Shutts test s7 simply stating
that "[h]ere, the claims of foreign purchasers... simply have no
meaningful contact with Minnesota. The conflicts analysis is thus
determinative of the issue's outcome." 8 Although not binding on
state courts, the District Court's ruling provides a strong argument

excessive latitude in application of forum law would create centers for certain types of
litigation since claimants would file in the jurisdiction with the most favorable law;
prior to Shutts's limitation on choice-of-law, application of forum law by the Kansas
courts had created a sort of magnet forum for royalty class actions); see e.g., Nix v. N.
Natural Gas Producing Co., 567 P.2d 1322 (Kan. 1977); Sterling v. Superior Oil Co.,
567 P.2d 1325 (Kan. 1977) (exemplifying previous class actions filed in Kansas seeking
recovery of interest on unpaid royalties from oil and gas leases).
252. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 333 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the constitutional standard for choice-of-law begins with the
"reasonable expectation of the parties").
253. 444 U.S. 320 (1980); see also supra note 247 and accompanying text.
254. See City of St. Paul v. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,305 (D.
Minn. 1990).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The second prong of the Shutts test refers to the determination of whether the
competing laws present a real conflict, rather than simply appearing to. See supra Part
II.C.1.
258. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 65,148.
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against the constitutionality of applying the antitrust law of a single
state to an entire nationwide class of indirect purchasers. "- 9
C. Manageability Concerns
Assuming, arguendo, that a state would have to apply the laws of
other interested states to indirect purchaser class members, would it
still be in the best interests of a state to entertain such an action?
Many of the benefits discussed earlier would not be realizable by the
forum state if it were required to apply the law of sister states~zw
However, a state might proceed with such an action through the use of
subclassing,. 1 which refers to the division of the class into a number of
smaller classes, with the intention of applying a different body of law
to each subclass.' z
Under such circumstances, the arguments against certification
become far more persuasive. After accepting the necessity of
subclasses, not only must a state court undertake the significant task
of interpreting the antitrust law of another jurisdiction,21 but it must
also analyze competing state interests to determine which state law

should apply. In such a suit, there may be three or more states with a
justifiable interest in the application of its law. One can imagine a
scenario in which a purchaser living in state A orders a product, while
in state B, from a manufacturer incorporated in state C, which is
subsequently delivered to the purchaser in state D. Such a case

259. Ultimately, a determination of the constitutionality of class-wide application
of forum law would turn on the specific facts of the case and, of course, the
relationship between the conduct at issue and the forum state. As one commentator
aptly noted:
In the antitrust context, analyzing a state's contacts to the plaintiffs' claims
may involve an examination of many factors including not only the location
of the defendants but also where and how the defendants' alleged
anticompetitive conduct occurred, and where the effects ... were felt. These
inquiries would seem to be fact specific and will require a determination of
whether the forum state has such a significant interest in the anticompetitive
conduct at issue that it may constitutionally justify applying its own antitrust
laws to the claims of out-of-state plaintiffs.
Safley & Krueger, supra note 207.
260. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text (describing the putative
benefits that a state may realize through adjudication of a nationwide class action).
261. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B) (stating that "a class may be divided into
subclasses and each subclass treated as a class").
262. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478, 483-85 (Il1.1981) (finding the use of
subclasses an efficient vehicle for the application of the laws of the fifty states in the
context of a multistate class action). In some instances, subclassing may only be
necessary for a determination of damages, such as situations where the factual
assertions are identical, but variation exists in state damage provisions. See supra note
227 and accompanying text.
263. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 65,147-48; see Miller & Crump, supra
note 84, at 64.
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provides a complex choice-of-law nexus for a state court to navigate in
order to determine which law to apply."
Any action considered in light of this conclusion must also
recognize that such a class would be limited to indirect purchasers
from states with an established statutory or common law right of

recovery. 265 Even within this limited group, sufficient variation exists
between state laws2t' so as to require the presumptive application of
each state's law to plaintiffs who have made purchases in those
states.267 Such a situation poses serious difficulties in the context of a
multistate class action.
First, the assessment and application of numerous states' antitrust
laws may prove a very difficult task for a state court judge.'
In this
setting, plaintiffs are asking a state court judge to understand and
apply the laws of numerous sister states, and possibly foreign
countries, to a single set of facts. In other words, the burden placed
on a court to make determinations about the law of foreign
jurisdictions and to apply that law, may render the class

unmanageable, 69 or certainly unattractive, to a state court.270 This

situation presents the further danger that analysis of other states' law
264. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6(1) (1969) (stating that "[a]
court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own
state on choice of law"). Such a directive, however, will often require the court to
determine which state has the greatest contact with the dispute, or which state has the
most important interests at stake. See id. at § 6(2). Such a decision may be a daunting
one in a nationwide class action. See Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 311-16 (5th Cir.
2000) (describing the difficulty in determining applicable law in the context of a
nationwide class action).
265. See Robinson v. EMI Music Distribution, Inc., 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,510 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1996).
266. See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
267. This conclusion, of course, ultimately avoids a protracted choice-of-law
analysis. It may be that a state court entertaining a multistate class of indirect
purchasers decides to apply the law of the plaintiff's home state, but in light of the
conclusions already drawn, it seems most feasible to retain a lex loci approach as the
court in Robinson apparently did. See Robinson, 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 77,68889.
268. See Miller & Crump, supra note 84, at 64 (explaining this difficulty by analogy
to a first year law student required to understand the law of all fifty states and apply it
correctly on the exam).
269. Rule 23(b)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to
take into account "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action." See Christopher J. Willis, Collision Course or Co-Existence? Amchem
Products v. Windsor and Proposed Rule 23(B)(4), 28 Cumb. L. Rev. 13, 25 (1998)
(explaining that "courts frequently find manageability problems when the presence of
individual issues in class members' claims would require separate 'mini-trials' on
issues not common to the class, or when different class members' claims would have
to be analyzed under varying states' laws").
270. City of St. Paul v. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,305, at 65,148
(D. Minn. 1990) (describing the task of analyzing and predicting the law of other
states as "burdensome"); see Sollenbarger v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 121
F.R.D. 417, 427-36 (D.N.M. 1988) (describing variations in the contract law of several
states).
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may ignore nuanced or underdeveloped aspects of those states'
antitrust laws.27'
D. Meeting the PredominanceRequirement of Rule 23(b)(3)
Even if attempts to create subclasses may cause some difficulty for
state courts, a more significant problem with the application of various
state laws to a class action is the threat that the task of adjudicating
such a complex action may fail the statutory requirements of class
action statutes such as Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' n Although Rule 23 is not binding upon state courts,
many states have adopted rules substantially similar or identical to
Rule 23 to govern class actions in their courts.2"
The predominance requirement as set forth in Rule 23(b)(3)
requires that issues affecting every member of the class, either factual
or legal, must "predominate" over those not affecting the entire

class. 74 A strict interpretation of the predominance requirement has

been a favorite tool of federal courts in recent years to decertify
nationwide class actions under 23(b)(3).215
Exemplifying this pattern is the Fifth Circuit's decision in Castano v.
American Tobacco Co. 76 Plaintiffs in Castano were addicted smokers
who sought certification of a nationwide class action against tobacco
companies, alleging, inter alia, fraud and breach of various consumer
protection statutes arising from the companies' failure to warn the
public of the addictive properties of nicotine.'
The district court
granted certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).m'
Reversing the district court's certification, the Fifth Circuit
criticized the lower court's reasoning on two distinct counts. First, the
court held that "[n]othing in the record demonstrates that the
271. See Thomas D. Waterman, Comment, State Court Jurisdictionover Multistate
PlaintiffClass Actions: Minimum Contactsand Miner v. Gillette, 69 Iowa L Rev. 795,
804 n.73 (1984) ("Courts applying the law of a different forum generally are less
knowledgeable in interpretation and less interested in fostering the policies of the

foreign jurisdiction than courts established by the state that provides the applicable
law.").

272. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that in order to maintain class status

"questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any

questions affecting only individual members"); see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
273. See, eg., Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23.01 (containing the same general requirements for
class treatment as the federal rule including numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
adequacy). For a discussion of class actions and the policy goals supporting them, see
supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.

275. See Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the "Choice of Law Problem" in

Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide ClassActions, 67 U. Chi. L Rev. 835, 841-42 (2000).
276. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
277. Id. at 737.
27& See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995).
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[district] court critically analyzed how variations in state law would
affect predominance."27 9 Examining the applicable state laws, the
circuit court found significant material variations, which may have the
effect of causing individual issues to predominate over common ones
in contravention of Rule 23(b)(3).m
The circuit court further
criticized the district court for failing to consider "whether the class
action would be manageable in light of state law variations."2"' The
Court proceeded to decertify the class.8
Castano sends an important message regarding the difficulty that
variations in state law may pose to the successful prosecution of a
class action.n 3 The court's strict interpretation of the predominance
requirement provides a strong precedent against certification of
multistate classes. 284
Another notable decertification ruling came in Spence v. Glock.2
Spence involved a suit brought against a gun manufacturer, alleging a
design defect which resulted in jamming and accidental discharge of
the pistols. 6 The district court had granted certification, but the Fifth
Circuit again reversed, citing erroneous analysis in the area of choiceof-law38 Following the choice-of-law rules of the forum state, Texas,
the circuit court concluded that the Second Restatement's "most
significant relationship"
test governed
the choice-of-law
determination. 9 Rejecting the district court's finding that Georgia, as
the site of manufacture of the guns, had the most significant
relationship to the controversy, Judge Jones, writing for the court,
held that "Texas' adoption of the most significant relationship test
requires that the policies of each state with contacts be examined."290
Consistent with its decision in Castano,2 9' the court in Spence placed
the burden on the plaintiff class to present "a sufficient choice-of-law
analysis." 2"
Concluding that plaintiffs had not presented such a
279. Castano, 84 F.3d at 743.
280. Id. at 740-43.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 752.
283. See Phair, supra note 275, at 841-42 (noting that "the comprehensiveness of
the Fifth Circuit's opinion has presented the federal courts with a towering precedent
that has been consistently used to resist certification of Rule 23(b)(3) nationwide class
action on choice-of-law grounds").
284. For a more complete discussion of Castano and the predominance
requirement at issue there, see Michael H. Pinkerton, Note, Castano v. American
Tobacco Company: America's Nicotine Plaintiffs Have No Class, 58 La. L. Rev. 647
(1998).
285. 227 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2000).
286. Id. at 310.
287. Id. at 311-15.
288. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1) (1969).
289. Spence, 227 F.3d at 311-12.
290. Id. at 313.
291. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,741 (5th Cir. 1996).
292. Spence, 227 F.3d at 313.

GOOD "BRICK" WALLS

2002]

2057

workable analysis or a subclassing plan, the court decertified on the
basis of a putative failure to comply with the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). 293
Spence thus seems to rest on the proposition that class certification
must fail if multiple laws apply and plaintiffs fail to provide a
workable plan for the application of the various laws. Although the
court does not state that such a plan would be impossible to construct,
the bar for certification nonetheless seems to be set quite high in
dealing with the laws of multiple jurisdictions.2
The difficulties encountered due to variations in state law in the
context of class actions in federal courts would seemingly be
compounded in an antitrust setting. Whereas the above examples of
federal class actions were dismissed because of variations in the law of
one or two particular standards, indirect purchaser class actions would
necessarily involve several elements of state law containing significant
variations 95 A state court would have to contend with variations in
standing requirements, requisite levels of proof, and variations in
damage allowances, with the resultant creation of a labyrinth of laws
through which the state court must weave its way if determined to
adjudicate the matter.
E. Some Cases Offering PracticalGuidancefor Resolttion
A California federal court offered an interesting response to the
persistent obstacle to class treatment presented by the variations in
interested state law in In re Pizza Time Theatre Securities Litigation.2
Pizza Time involved a class action alleging violations of securities
regulations with pendent fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims. 9 Adjudication of these pendent common law claims required
a choice-of-law inquiry to determine which state's law should
govern.298

Applying California's choice-of-law principles, - the district court
determined that "each of the interested jurisdictions shares the goals
of deterring fraudulent conduct, protecting those wrongly accused of
fraud, and providing a remedy for [those] who have been defrauded in
293. Id. at 316.
294. But see Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (promoting the
use of subclasses for settlement purposes in class action suits).
295. See City of St. Paul v. FMC Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,305, at
65,147-48 (D. Minn. 1990).
296. 112 F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see also In re Seagate Techs. Sec. Litig., 115
F.R.D. 264 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
297. Pizza Time, 112 F.R.D. at 15.
298. Id.

299. Id. at 19. In discussing California's approach to choice-of-law, the court stated

"the [California] court employs the 'comparative impairment' approach to determine
which jurisdiction's interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to
the policy of the other." Id.
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the manner alleged here."3°°
Concluding that the separate
prosecution of each individual claim would be "complex and
expensive to litigate," 3 1 the court found class certification to be the
most effective method of redressing the alleged economic injury. In
reconciling the laws of the varying jurisdictions, the court found that,
despite minor variations, each state's interest in providing a remedy is
paramount and, as such, "[no] jurisdiction has a greater interest in
applying its own law than in assuring the maintenance of a class
action. ' '31 Essentially, the court here subordinated the possible
variations in relevant state law to the policy behind that law, which
favored recovery for injured residents.
In indirect purchaser suits, subordinating the variations in state law
will not result in the vindication of "shared goals" by all the states
involved. As discussed, states have made conflicting determinations
as to what the goals of purchaser suits are generally. The California
Appellate Division put the scenario of a multistate class action into
excellent perspective in its decision in Osborne v. Subaru of America,
Inc. 303 Osborne involved a class action filed on behalf of Subaru
owners nationwide, complaining of a design defect that caused
widespread breakdowns.?° Upholding the trial court's denial of class
certification, the appellate division applied the two-prong choice-oflaw test laid out in Shutts. °5 The court first concluded, over
petitioners' objections, that there existed meaningful variations
between applicable laws of other states.306 Furthermore, the appellate
division agreed with the trial court that California lacked sufficient
contacts with the out-of-state plaintiffs, such that California law could
not apply to their claims.3 7 Given this state of affairs, the court
require the
concluded that "certification of a nationwide class would
38
adjudication of numerous separate questions of law.
More importantly, the Osborne court provided a strong
jurisprudential framework within which to view this certification
decision. The court laid out three compelling circumstances, all
absent in indirect purchaser suits, under which California should
undertake to adjudicate such a large class action: (1) if to do so would
benefit the California claimants, (2) if it would benefit the California

300. Id. at 20.
301. Id. The court found that the attempted application of each states' laws would
"pose fatal manageability problems under Rule 23." Id.
302. Id.
303. 243 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
304. Id. at 816.
305. Id. at 819-22.
306. Id. at 819.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 822.

2002]

GOOD "BRICK" WALLS

2059

judicial system, or (3) if California has some special obligation to
adjudicate the controversy.3 0
No benefit would have accrued to the California litigants in
Osborne because the time and energy required to dispose of a
multitude of claims would only delay recovery by requiring California
plaintiffs to "endure the many years of litigation that would inevitably
be entailed in the adjudication of a nationwide class claim."""0
Additionally, this action would not have benefited the judicial system
of the state because "[it is unrealistic to think that claimants from
other states would pursue individual lawsuits against Subaru in
California." ''

Although the California courts may obtain judicial

jurisdiction over such a subsequent action, the court quite properly
noted that it was unlikely that a nationwide class would eliminate
duplicative proceedings in the state.
Finally, California had no special obligation to expend its resources
in the adjudication of these claims. a3 The court quoted a previous
decision, noting "California has no interest in providing residents of
other states greater protection than their home states provide ....
[W]hy should California take314 it upon itself to be the savior of the
other 49 states of the union?
The court's lack of interest in adjudicating a nationwide class action
demonstrates an implicit rejection of the considerations of substantial
justice that may be achieved through adjudication of an indirect
purchaser class action. It further appears that the court was not
concerned with the inability of plaintiffs from less populous states to
mount an independent class action.
Although both of these
considerations should carry significant weight with a state court, they
need not require the state system to navigate an unwieldy lawsuit
through often unfamiliar legal territory.
In an indirect purchaser paradigm, a state court considering class
certification should take note of the court's decision in Osborne. In
the vast majority of situations, none of the positive effects noted by
Osborne would be derived from certifying those class actions. There
would certainly be no benefit to the judicial system, since application
of laws of other jurisdictions would not further the interests of the
forum state and would likely consume significant judicial resources
within the forum state. The burdens accompanying the resolution of

309. Id. at 825-26.
310. Id. at 825.
311. Id.
312 Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. (quoting Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 236 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987)).
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such a large and complex class action would not be offset by any
corresponding benefits save a possible sense of prestige." 5
Although potential plaintiffs could obtain personal jurisdiction over
a corporate defendant in the forum state, the court's reasoning in
Osborne holds true nonetheless. Most plaintiffs from other states
simply would not choose to bring suit in a distant forum.316
Additionally, no benefit would accrue to the litigants from the forum
state, who would have to await the resolution of the entire class action
317
before receiving their presumably meager and diluted recoveries.
A state's most persuasive argument may be based on a "special
obligation," as explained in Osborne.318 Depending upon the industry
involved in the litigation, a state may perceive a duty to maintain
economic competition within that industry for the benefit of the
forum state. 319 For example, in Robinson, the Tennessee court may
well have employed such an argument in defense of certification.
Absent this special situation, however, a state would have no alternate
reason to certify a class of indirect purchasers.3 20
F. Deference as a Matter of Federalismand Comity
Thus far, this Note has argued that if a state court must apply the
laws of sister states to a multistate class action, certification of that
class would be a mistake. The challenge of manageability attendant to
such a suit would far outweigh any efficiency gains intended by the
use of the class action device. If, however, the forum state found it
desirable and constitutionally permissible to apply its own law to the
entire plaintiff class, would this affect the efficiency calculation in the
certification decision?
As a matter of federalism and comity with its fellow sovereigns, a
state considering certification of a multistate class would be well
advised to defer to the greater interests of a sister state. In an
antitrust context, several states will maintain an interest in the
application of their antitrust laws to the dispute, with the twin aims of
protecting their citizens and furthering the policies giving rise to their
antitrust laws. 3 1 Notwithstanding the constitutionality of applying
315. See Wasserman, supra note 152, at 476.
316. See Osborne,243 Cal. Rptr. At 825.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 825-26.
319. See supra note 179-80 and accompanying text.
320. Other difficulties attendant to the certification of a multistate class of indirect
purchasers, although quite prevalent, are beyond the scope of this discussion. For a
more complete discussion of such difficulties, see Page, supra note 72, at 3. Among
other difficulties, Page notes the challenge of proving actual pass-on of damages
through complex economic models. See id. at 12-19.
321. See Currie, supra note 231, at 237-44 (explaining how interest analysis may

play a distinct role in resolving conflicts of laws). For a typical statement of state
interests at work in the context of state antitrust law, see Texas Business &
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forum law, concerns of federalism argue strongly for deference to the
law of a more interested jurisdiction when the levels of interest are so
disparate.3,
Although the idea of a state court abstaining in favor of an
anticipated proceeding in a more interested state court is a novel one,
an apposite and informative parallel can be gleaned through
examination of the common law doctrine of abstention employed by
federal courts.3" The abstention doctrine holds that, in certain
situations, 324 federal courts should "decline to proceed" despite having
proper jurisdiction over the matter.3 2- For present purposes, the most
n 6 which
apposite precedent is provided by Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
centered on the decision of a state regulatory commission granting
drilling rights along a railroad right of way.-' Despite proper federal
jurisdiction based on both diversity and a federal question, a divided
Court found that the federal court should abstain from acting on the
current matter, as such action would interfere with a matter of vital
state policy.32 Citing Texas's "well organized system of regulation
and review," 9 the Court held that federal action would only serve to
create "[d]elay, misunderstanding...
and needless federal conflict
330
with the state policy

The Court's holding in Burford informs us of the strong basis for
abstention in cases bearing on a central question of state policy."' As
noted above, abstention doctrine has no formal application as
between states. A state court, however, would be well-advised to
Commerce Code Annotated § 15.04 (Vernon 1987) ("The purpose of this Act is to
maintain and promote economic competition in trade and commerce... and to
provide the benefits of that competition to consumers in the state.").
322. This argument is by no means intended to establish an enduring legal holding
that all courts should defer to the most interested jurisdiction, as such a rule would
result in only one forum having the ability to adjudicate any given case.
323. See Wright, supra note 155, § 52. The federal abstention doctrine is, in fact, a
number of doctrines illustrating situations in which federal courts should "decline to
proceed" despite having proper jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
Id. at 303.
324. Though primary reference here will be made to "Burford abstention," see
Wright, supra note 155, § 52, federal abstention doctrine addresses a number of
diverse situations. See, eg., R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500
(1941) (justifying abstention of federal courts when the matter in question may be
decided as a matter of state law, rather than through a "premature constitutional
adjudication" by federal courts).
325. Wright, supra note 155, § 52.
326. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 334.
329. Id at 327.
330. Id.
331. Wright, supra note 155, § 52. Abstention is also justified in cases involving
unsettled state law. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
Such grounds for abstention may be particularly germane to an antitrust context, in
which the right of indirect purchasers to recover may not be fully resolved as yet.

2062

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

entertain similar reasoning in passing a decision on certification of a
multistate class of indirect purchasers.
G. Use or Abuse: PotentialMisuse of the ClassAction Device
An examination of the practical situation in which many indirect
purchaser class actions are brought supplies a potential defendant
with a strong equitable argument against certification.332 Such class
actions are often filed with the ostensible aim of forcing a defendant
into a universal settlement, which could be challenged in any number
of other jurisdictions.333 Faced with a multistate class involving
potentially hundreds of thousands of claimants, a corporate defendant
is forced to choose between settlement and a small chance of
potentially ruinous liability at the hands of a jury.33

Judge Friendly

has termed such situations "blackmail settlements,"335 especially since
such settlements often "constitut[e] a small fraction of the amount
claimed but large enough to yield compensation to the plaintiffs'
lawyers which seems inordinate even in these days of high legal
fees. ' 336 The underlying motivation for a state to grant certification to
these cases may be the almost assuredly large attorney's fee generated
by the settlement of a multistate class action. 37
Judge Posner recently expressed his own contempt for the notion of
338
a "blackmail settlement" in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.
Rhone-Poulenc involved a nationwide class action brought by
hemophiliacs claiming they had been infected with HIV through the
use of defendant's blood products. Although the class action had
been granted certification at the district level,339 Judge Posner, writing
332. See Coffee, supra note 73.
333. See O'Connor, supra note 8, at 38.
334. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An InstitutionalEvolutionist Perspective, 80

Cornell L. Rev. 941, 958 (1995) (claiming that "[t]he certification of mass tort class
actions, moreover, practically ensures that the litigation will be settled short of trial").
335. Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973).
336. Id.; see also In re Cedant Corp. Prides Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 735-39 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding district court's award of nearly $20 million attorney fee to be an abuse

of discretion because the matter was neither exceedingly complicated nor time
consuming).
337. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 68 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(discussing the perception that plaintiffs' lawyers have developed a "class action
industry"). For a discussion of the role of attorneys fees in antitrust litigation, see
Edward D. Cavanagh, Attorneys' Fees in Antitrust Litigation: Making the System
Fairer,57 Fordham L. Rev. 51 (1988) (presenting the issue of attorney's fees as
inherent in the system of privatized antitrust enforcement), and Jack B. Weinstein,
Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 433, 436
(1960) ("The most serious objections that individual parties threatened by class
actions have raised is that class actions ... are used primarily to earn legal fees for
attorneys who bring them.").
338. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
339. Id. at 1296-97 (citing the district court's certification of a class of hemophiliacs
infected with HIV for the limited determination of defendants' liability with regard to

2002]

GOOD "BRICK" WALLS

2063

for a split panel, issued a writ of mandamus decertifying the class . '
Posner's main objection to certification, even for the limited
determination of negligence, was a fear that an adverse judgment
might render a company, even an entire industry, bankrupt.U
Posner's aversion to class treatment in this instance was compounded
by the fact that twelve of the thirteen verdicts in the individual
lawsuits on identical claims had been rendered in favor of the
defendant?' 2 Posner noted, however, "jury number fourteenf may
disagree with twelve of the previous thirteen juries-and hurl the
industry into bankruptcy." 3 Facing such an adverse judgment, the
defendant would be forced to settle to avoid bankruptcy.
Consideration of other factors notwithstanding,-" the motivation
behind this decision appears to be the protection of an industry from
facing a virtually forced settlement in the face of dubious liability.3'
Judge Posner's explicit recognition of the dangers of the class action
proceeding for a defendant and the lack of protection afforded a
defendant by Rule 23 provides federal courts with a strong precedent
through which to view class certification. Although Judge Posner's
opinion has been criticized on both economic and legal grounds, his
decision does go a long way towards curbing perceived abuses of the
class action procedure.
CONCLUSION

Despite an original understanding to the contrary, federal antitrust
law has long constituted the principal means of enforcement against
antitrust violators, both private and public. In the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in ARC America, however, state antitrust
law is re-emerging as an important factor in the antitrust landscape.
negligence under either of two theories proffered by plaintiffs).
340. Id. at 1304.
341. Id. at 1298.
342- Id
343. Id. at 1300.
344. Posner also expressed concern over the standard of negligence according to
which defendant's conduct was to be judged. Id at 1300-02. Rather than adopting the
standard of one state, or creating subclasses through which to apply the laws of
multiple states, the district judge proposed application of a generalized -common
law" theory of negligence to be uniformly applied. Id. at 1300. Posner also noted that
the sizeable nature of each individual claim would merit individual litigation. Id.
Failure of class certification, therefore, would not have the effect of denying plaintiffs
a remedy. This contention, however, may carry far less weight in the context of
indirect purchaser litigation, where the relatively small amount of each individual
claim would, as a practical matter, preclude the filing of individual actions. Compare
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996), where the claims might
practically have been filed on an individual basis, with In re Pizza Time Theatre Sec.
Litig., 112 F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Cal. 1986), where the claims could only be prosecuted as a
class action.
345. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995).
346. See Bough & Bough, supra note 94, at 19-20.
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In no area has this proven more true than in the context of suits
brought by indirect purchasers seeking recovery for overcharges
resulting from manufacturer price fixing, as federal law fails to
provide a remedy for such injury.
Although the provision of a remedy to indirect purchasers is an
assuredly noble goal of state antitrust law, the uncoordinated nature
of state court proceedings in this area has led to numerous
inefficiencies and novel legal challenges. This Note has attempted to
isolate and analyze one such area of concern, namely, the question of
whether a state court should certify a nationwide class of indirect
purchasers seeking recovery under state antitrust law.
Class certification has the potential both to provide substantial
benefits to the forum state and to achieve some measure of substantial
justice through the provision of a remedy to victims of admittedly
illegal conduct. Such a suit, however, may also become a "mine
field" 7 through its ramifications for federalism and individual due
process rights. This Note focuses on the question of certification and
analyzes arguments both for and against such certification.
Concluding that constitutional constraints prohibit application of
forum law to a nationwide class of indirect purchasers, this Note
cautions that certification of such a class would saddle a state court
with a tremendous judicial task, while failing to achieve any
meaningful benefit for the litigants or the forum state. Certification of
a nationwide class of indirect purchasers opens the door, moreover, to
manifold abuse of the class action device.

347. Enforcement: ABA Committee Surveys Landscape of State Antitrust Law and
Trade Regulation, 76 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 413 (Apr. 22, 1999).

